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Abstract 
This report (Nuclear Power Plant Security Assessment Technical Manual) is a revi-
sion to NUREG/CR-1345 (Nuclear Power Plant Design Concepts for Sabotage Pro-
tection) that was published in January 1981.  It provides conceptual and specific tech-
nical guidance for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission nuclear power plant design 
certification and combined operating license applicants as they: 
• develop the layout of a facility (i.e., how buildings are arranged on the site 
property and how they are arranged internally) to enhance protection 
against sabotage and facilitate the use of physical security features, 
• design the physical protection system to be used at the facility, and 
• analyze the effectiveness of the PPS against the design basis threat. 
It should be used as a technical manual in conjunction with the Nuclear Power Plant 
Security Assessment Format and Content Guide.  The opportunity to optimize physi-
cal protection in the design of a nuclear power plant is obtained when an applicant 
utilizes both documents when performing a security assessment. 
This document provides a set of best practices that incorporates knowledge gained 
from more than 30 years of physical protection system design and evaluation activi-
ties at Sandia National Laboratories and insights derived from U.S. Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission technical staff into a manual that describes a development and 
analysis process of physical protection systems suitable for future nuclear power 
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plants.  In addition, selected security system technologies that may be used in a 
physical protection system are discussed. 
The scope of this document is limited to the identification of a set of best practices as-
sociated with the design and evaluation of physical security at future nuclear power 
plants in general.  As such, it does not provide specific recommendations for the de-
sign and evaluation of physical security for any specific reactor design.  These best 
practices should be applicable to the design and evaluation of physical security for all 
future plants. 
Note that the original NUREG/CR-1345 remains valid for many light water reactor 
designs. 
While the focus of this document is on new plants, existing nuclear power plants and 
nuclear material facilities may be able to apply these best practices and security sys-
tem technologies when upgrading or modifying their physical protection systems. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has received an increase in design certification 
applications for nuclear power plants and anticipates several others by 2008.  The NRC has also 
been notified of the intent to submit ten or more combined license applications between FY2007 
and FY2008.  As such there is renewed interest to update and revise NUREG/CR-1345, which 
was originally published in 1981.  This version of the revised NUREG/CR-1345 is titled Nuclear 
Power Plant Security Assessment Technical Manual. 
This manual should be used when design certification or combined license applicants perform a 
security assessment and should be used in conjunction with the Nuclear Power Plant Security 
Assessment Format and Content Guide [Ref. 1]. 
The NRC staff requested the revision employ a more global rather than design-specific approach 
(as was done in the original NUREG/CR) such that the revised NUREG/CR may be applicable to 
the many various reactor designs being presented, including future Generation IV designs. 
1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this document is to provide conceptual and specific technical guidance1 for nu-
clear power plant design certification and combined operating license applicants as they: 
• develop the layout of a facility (i.e., how buildings are arranged on the site property and 
how they are arranged internally) to enhance protection against sabotage and facilitate 
use of physical security features 
• design the physical protection system (PPS) to be used at the facility 
• analyze the effectiveness of the PPS against the design basis threat 
It should be used as a technical manual in conjunction with Reference 1.  The opportunity to op-
timize physical protection in the design of a nuclear power plant is obtained when an applicant 
utilizes both documents when performing a security assessment. 
1.3 Objectives 
The objective of this guidance document is to incorporate knowledge gained from more than 30 
years of PPS design and evaluation activities at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and insights 
derived from the NRC technical staff into a set of best practices for application to the develop-
ment and analysis of physical protection systems for future nuclear power plants. 
The document has been written in plain English and explanatory text to the greatest extent possi-
ble to allow those unfamiliar with physical protection to utilize the information presented. 
                                                 
1The authors recognize that while the guidance provided in this document is based upon knowledge gleaned from 
past experiences and analyses, it may not prove infallible for all possible future events.  Nevertheless, the authors 
believe the guidance presented here represents the best information available at this time. 
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1.4 Scope 
The scope of this project is limited to the identification of a set of best practices associated with 
the design and evaluation of physical security at future nuclear power plants in general.  As such, 
it does not provide specific recommendations for the design and evaluation of physical security 
for any specific reactor design.  These best practices should be applicable to the design and 
evaluation of physical security for all future plants. 
Existing nuclear power plants and certain nuclear material facilities may be able to apply these 
best practices when upgrading or modifying their physical protection systems. 
1.5 Report Organization 
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the report.  Background material is presented in Section 
1.1, and the purpose, objectives, and scope are presented in Sections 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4, respec-
tively.  Chapter 2 provides a high-level overview of the recommended approach for designing an 
effective PPS and analyzing its performance.  Chapter 3 provides a brief description of a repre-
sentative set of currently available analytical tools that can be used in a security system perform-
ance assessment.  Chapter 4 provides a compilation of high-level and conceptual guidance (i.e., 
best practices) distilled from more than 30 years of work in the area of physical security system 
design.  These best practices should be considered during the design of a physical security sys-
tem.  Chapter 5 provides a brief description of a selected set of security system technologies that 
a nuclear power plant design team might consider during the design of the plant and its physical 
security system.  Chapter 6 provides a summary of the observations and insights from the 
NUREG/CR-1345 report that are appropriate for this document (i.e., observations and insights 
that are general in nature and not design specific).  Chapter 7 concludes the report with a brief 
summary of the main points presented throughout the document.  
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2. DESIGN AND EVALUATION OF A 
PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM 
This chapter presents a summary of the activities associated with the design and evaluation of a 
physical protection system (PPS).  The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the major activities 
that must be accomplished during such a design and evaluation.  For a more detailed, in-depth 
presentation on this topic (i.e., design and evaluation of a PPS) see The Design and Evaluation of 
Physical Protection Systems by Mary Lynn Garcia [Ref. 2].  Additionally, refer to another book 
by Garcia entitled Vulnerability Assessment of Physical Protection Systems [Ref. 3], which is an 
extension of the overall process and principles of physical protection systems presented in the 
first book to vulnerability assessment—identifying security system weaknesses that could poten-
tially be exploited by malevolent human threats.  These identified weaknesses are potential areas 
for improvement. 
2.1 Overview 
The design of an effective PPS includes identification of the PPS objectives, establishing the fa-
cility design, providing an initial design of a PPS, evaluation of the design, and a redesign or re-
finement of the system (if the system does not meet required protection objectives).  Figure 2-1 
is a pictorial representation of this process. 
Analyze PPS 
Design
Identify PPS 
Objectives
Design 
PPS
Final PPS
Design
Redesign 
PPS
Establish 
Facility 
Design
 
Figure 2-1. High-level description of a physical protection system design and evaluation 
process. 
The designer should identify protection objectives for the facility from the applicable regula-
tions.  For U.S. nuclear power plants, protection objectives for the PPS are to provide high assur-
ance of protection against significant core damage and sabotage (or theft2) of spent fuel against 
the design basis threat (DBT).3  To establish the facility design the designer must begin by gath-
ering information about facility operations and conditions, such as a comprehensive description 
of the facility, operating states, and the physical protection requirements.  Next the designer 
should identify targets.  Targets typically consist of equipment, personnel, and radioactive 
sources that, if damaged or destroyed, would result in unacceptable offsite consequences.  The 
next step is to design the PPS.  In designing the PPS, the designer must determine how best to 
                                                 
2For facilities that will use mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, the threat of theft or diversion of unirradiated MOX fuel as-
semblies must also be considered. 
3The DBT defines (or describes) the following aspects about potential adversaries: class of adversary, adversary=s 
capabilities, and range of adversary tactics.  
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combine such elements as fences, building structures, vaults, sensors, administrative procedures, 
communication devices, and protective force personnel to meet the objectives.  Once a PPS is 
designed, it must be analyzed and evaluated to ensure it meets the physical protection objectives.  
Evaluation must allow for features working together to assure protection rather than regarding 
each feature separately.  Due to the complexity of protection systems, an evaluation may require 
the application of modeling techniques.  If the evaluation determines that PPS effectiveness4 is 
unacceptable, then the initial system must be redesigned to correct vulnerabilities and a reevalu-
ation conducted.  This iterative process continues until the PPS effectiveness is determined to be 
acceptable.  Figure 2-2 illustrates the activities associated with this design and evaluation proc-
ess. 
Analyze PPS Design
Analysis/Evaluation
Pathway Analysis
(Adversary Sequence
Diagrams) 
Risk Analysis
Neutralization 
Analysis
Identify PPS 
Objectives
Threat Definition
Protection 
Objectives 
Identification
Design PPS
Detection
Exterior
Sensors
Interior
Sensors
Alarm Assessment
Alarm
Communication & Display
Delay
Access
Delay
Response
Response
Force
Response Force
Communications
Entry Control
Final PPS
Design
Redesign 
PPS
Physical Protection Systems
Establish 
Facility 
Design
Target 
Identification
Facility 
Characterization
 
Figure 2-2. Activities associated with a physical protection system design and evalua-
tion process. 
This is a methodical approach in which the design and analysis of physical protection is con-
ducted in an integrated fashion where all components of detection, delay, and response are prop-
erly weighted according to their contribution to the PPS as a whole.  This approach can assist in 
minimizing the potential for wasting valuable resources on unnecessary protection while at the 
same time maximizing protection to the facility. 
A simplified description of the recommended process of designing and analyzing a PPS is pre-
sented in the subsequent sections of this chapter. 
2.2 Identify the PPS Objectives 
The first major activity in the development of a PPS design, as shown in Figure 2-2, is identify 
PPS objectives.  This activity involves two subtasks: 
                                                 
4The effectiveness of a PPS is determined as part of a malevolent-threat risk analysis.  In this analysis risk is a func-
tion of the frequency of the threat (i.e., the DBT) occurrence, the probability that the PPS will fail to protect against 
the malevolent threat, and the consequences (i.e., the undesired events) associated with the failure of the PPS. 
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• threat definition 
• protection objectives identification 
These two subtasks are discussed in the following subsections. 
2.2.1 Threat Definition 
The threat definition will be defined by the DBT as provided by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC).5 
The establishment of a threat definition typically considers the following three questions: 
• What class of adversary is to be considered? 
• What is the range of the adversary=s tactics? 
• What are the adversary’s capabilities? 
Adversaries can be separated into three classes:  
• outsiders 
• insiders 
• outsiders in collusion with insiders 
For each class of adversary, the full range of tactics (i.e., deceit, force, stealth, or any combina-
tion of these) is considered.  Deceit is the attempted defeat of a security system by using false 
authorization and identification; force is the overt, forcible attempt to overcome a security sys-
tem; and stealth is the attempt to defeat the detection system and enter the facility covertly. 
Adversary capabilities include knowledge of the PPS, level of motivation, skills useful in carry-
ing out the attack (e.g., knowledge of the safety systems), the speed with which the attack is car-
ried out, and the ability to carry and use tools and weapons. 
2.2.2 Protection Objectives Identification 
Protection objectives are identified for each facility type from the applicable regulations.  For 
U.S. nuclear power plants, protection objectives include high assurance of protection against sig-
nificant core damage and sabotage of spent fuel.  Prevention of theft of MOX fuel is also a pro-
tection objective for U.S. nuclear power plants that utilize MOX fuel assemblies.  Protection ob-
jectives for NRC fuel fabrication licensees are prevention of theft of special nuclear material and 
radiological sabotage. 
2.3 Establish Facility Design 
The second major activity in the development of a PPS design, as shown in Figure 2-2, is estab-
lish facility design.  This activity involves two subtasks: 
 
                                                 
510 CFR 73.1 addresses the DBT. 
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• facility characterization 
• target identification 
These two subtasks are discussed in the following subsections. 
2.3.1 Facility Characterization 
Establishing a facility’s design requires the development of a thorough description of the facility 
itself (e.g., the location of the site boundary, location of buildings on the site, interior floor plans 
for the buildings, and access points for both the site and buildings), a thorough understanding of 
the various operations that take place at the facility, and knowledge of the different conditions 
that the facility will experience.  This information can be obtained from sources such as facility 
design blueprints, process descriptions, safety analysis reports, probabilistic risk assessment re-
ports, and environmental impact statements.6  As with any complex facility that requires physical 
protection, compromises must be made among the three disciplines of safety, operations, and 
physical protection to ensure no one discipline is adversely affected by another.  
2.3.2 Target Identification 
To be able to develop adequate protection one must know what to protect.  Protecting everything 
is neither possible nor practical.  Thus effective security protects a minimum, yet a complete, set 
of items necessary to prevent the undesired consequences defined by the NRC.  Undesirable con-
sequences generally fall into two categories: those from theft of nuclear material and those from 
radiological sabotage.  While both may have to be considered during the design and evaluation 
of a PPS, radiological sabotage typically represents the more limiting case for the PPS at a com-
mercial nuclear power plant.  This is because a radiological saboteur may need only to enter the 
site to destroy a target whereas for theft, the adversary must obtain special nuclear material and 
successfully exit the site.  Therefore prevention of radiological sabotage, where an adversary 
must enter the site, is the focus for the remainder of this document. 
For nuclear power plants the method of target identification includes starting with the probabilis-
tic risk assessment (level 1) fault tree analysis and deriving target sets. 
As defined in the proposed rule, 10 CFR 73.2,  the term Target Set means the combination of 
equipment or operator actions which, if all are prevented from performing their intended safety 
function or prevented from being accomplished, would likely result in significant core damage 
(e.g., non-incipient, non-localized fuel melting, and/or core disruption) barring extraordinary ac-
tion by plant operators.  A target set with respect to spent fuel sabotage is draining of the spent 
fuel pool leaving the spent fuel uncovered for a period of time, allowing spent fuel heat-up and 
the associated potential for release of fission products. 
A protection set is located in vital areas and is defined to be the set of locations and/or systems, 
structures, an components that if protected from access and/or damage ensure that the PPS pro-
                                                 
6For new plants this information should be made available to the PPS designer as soon as possible so that the PPS 
designer can work with the plant designer to integrate security into the plant design.  One simple example of this 
would be designing the equipment layout of the plant such that a set of equipment necessary to prevent undesired 
consequences is located in a single hardened structure with only one entrance/exit. 
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tection objectives are met (i.e., significant core damage, sabotage of spent fuel, and theft of 
un-irradiated MOX fuel assemblies do not occur). 
Target set development is listed as a regulatory requirement within the proposed revision of 10 
CFR 73.55.  The NRC considers detailed consideration of target set development sensitive un-
classified safeguards information.  The NRC has developed guidance for target set development 
and it may be found in Appendix B of the Nuclear Power Plant Security Assessment Format and 
Content Guide. 
It is also recommended that references [Ref. 4] and [Ref. 5] be reviewed before conducting target 
set development. 
2.4 Design the Physical Protection System 
The third major activity in the development of a PPS design, as shown in Figure 2-2, is design 
PPS.  The objective of a PPS is to prevent the accomplishment of unauthorized overt or covert 
actions that result in radiological sabotage or theft of nuclear materials (i.e., the undesired events 
and subsequent consequences).  The PPS must accomplish its objectives by either deterrence or a 
combination of detection, delay, and response. 
Theft and sabotage may be prevented in two ways: by deterring the adversary or by defeating the 
adversary.  Deterrence occurs by implementing a PPS that is seen by potential adversaries as too 
difficult to defeat; it makes the facility an unattractive target.  In addition, legal ramifications as-
sociated with attacking a site may deter some adversaries, although not a determined one.  The 
problem with deterrence is that it is impossible (or at least extremely difficult) to measure,7 and 
therefore will not be discussed further.  Defeating the adversary refers to the actions taken by the 
protective or response force to prevent an adversary from accomplishing his goal once he actu-
ally begins a malevolent action against a facility.  There are three major functions that the PPS 
must perform.  These include: 
• detection 
• delay 
• response 
These functions must be performed in a period of time that is less than the time required for the 
adversary to complete his tasks.  Figure 2-3 shows the relationship between adversary task time 
and the time required for the PPS to do its job.  The total time required for the adversary to ac-
complish his goal has been labeled Adversary Task Time.  It is dependent upon the delay pro-
vided by the PPS.  The adversary may begin his task at some time before the first alarm occurs 
(T0).  The adversary task time is shown by a dotted line before this point because delay is not ef-
fective before detection.8  After that alarm, the alarm information must be reported and assessed 
to determine whether the alarm is valid.  The time at which the alarm is assessed to be valid is 
                                                 
7It would be a mistake to assume because a system has not been challenged by an adversary that the effectiveness of 
the system has deterred such challenges. 
8It is recognized that delay may be an effective contributor to deterring an adversary; however, for those cases 
where the adversary has not been deterred, delay before detection does not contribute to the effectiveness of the 
PPS. 
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labeled TA, and at this time the location of the alarm must be communicated to the members of 
the response force.  Further time is then required for the response force to respond in adequate 
numbers and with adequate equipment to interrupt and neutralize the adversary actions.  The 
time at which the response force interrupts adversary actions is labeled TI and adversary task 
completion time is labeled TC.  From an examination of this time line, it is clear that detection 
(i.e., T0 and TA) and response (i.e., TI) should occur as early as possible; in other words, these 
events should be as far to the left on the time axis as possible. 
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Figure 2-3.  Interrelationship among physical protection system functions. 
A brief discussion of each function is presented in the following subsection.  
2.4.1 Physical Protection System Functions 
2.4.1.1 Detection 
Detection is the discovery of an adversary action.  It includes sensing of covert or overt actions.  
To discover an adversary action, the following events must occur: 
• A sensor9 reacts to an abnormal occurrence and initiates an alarm. 
• The information from the sensor and assessment subsystems is reported and displayed. 
• A person assesses information and judges the alarm to be valid or invalid.  If assessed to 
be a nuisance or false alarm,10 a detection has not occurred.  Detection without assess-
ment is not considered detection. 
                                                 
9A sensor in this context could be a detection device or an individual. 
10Regulatory Guide 5.44, Revision 3 defines a nuisance alarm as an alarm generated by an identified input [emphasis 
added] to a sensor or monitoring device that does not represent a safeguards threat.  It defines a false alarm as an 
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These actions are depicted in Figure 2-4. 
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Figure 2-4.  Actions comprising the detection function in a physical protection system. 
The measure of effectiveness for the detection function is probability of detection, PD, which is a 
function of the probability of sensing an adversary action, PS, and the time required for an alarm 
signal to be generated, for the alarm to be reported, and for the alarm to be assessed.  However 
an alarm is assessed it should be accomplished as soon after the alarm is generated to ensure 
adequate physical protection system effectiveness. 
Detection can also be accomplished by the protective force or personnel.  Guards at fixed posts 
or on patrol may serve a role in sensing (i.e., detecting) an intrusion; however the probability of 
detection associated with such activities is typically low.  Personnel may contribute to detection 
of an insider action if the two-person rule is used in critical areas and the second person has a 
reliable means of signaling or communicating an alarm. 
An effective assessment system provides two types of information associated with detection: in-
formation about whether the alarm is a valid, nuisance, or false alarm and details about the cause 
of the alarm (i.e., who they are, where they are, what they have, how many there are, and what 
they are doing). 
2.4.1.1.1 External Sensors 
The integration of individual sensors into a perimeter (i.e., external) sensor system must con-
sider: 
• specific design goals 
• the effects of physical and environmental conditions 
• the interaction of the perimeter system with a balanced and integrated PPS 
Sensor performance is described by the following characteristics: 
• probability of detection 
• false and nuisance alarm rates 
• vulnerability to defeat 
The methods of classification of exterior sensors include: 
                                                                                                                                                             
alarm generated without an apparent cause [emphasis added].  Thus in both cases (i.e., nuisance and false alarms), 
detection has not occurred (i.e., no adversary detection has occurred). 
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• passive or active 
• covert or visible 
• line of sight or terrain following 
• volumetric or line detection 
• application (i.e., grouped by mode of application in the physical detection space) 
– buried-line 
– fence-associated 
– freestanding 
 
An effective perimeter sensor system provides a continuous line of detection using multiple lines 
of complementary sensors located in an isolated clear zone.  Topography, vegetation, wildlife, 
background noise, climate, weather, soil conditions, and pavement all affect the performance of 
exterior sensors.  Using alarm priority schemes11 can reduce the nuisance alarm rate.  The de-
signer of the perimeter sensor system must also consider its interaction with the video assessment 
system and the access delay system. 
2.4.1.1.2 Interior Sensors 
Interior intrusion sensors can be: 
• active or passive 
• covert or visible 
• volumetric or line detectors 
Their performance is discussed in terms of: 
• probability of detection 
• false and nuisance alarm rates 
• vulnerability to defeat 
The application classes include: 
• boundary penetration sensors 
• interior motion sensors 
• proximity sensors 
Various sensor technologies can be applied to achieve protection-in-depth:  
                                                 
11The nuisance alarm rate (NAR) can be significantly reduced by combining sensors with an AND gate if the nui-
sance alarms of the sensors are not correlated.  A seismic sensor and an electric field sensor do not give correlated 
alarms, for example, because they respond to different things.  If both are activated at about the same time, it is 
probable that they have detected an intrusion.  A system can be designed to generate an alarm if two or more sensors 
are all activated within a preselected time interval (T).  The nuisance alarm rate of the AND combination, 
NAR(AND), will be less than the nuisance alarm rate of each sensor.  If the sensor outputs are uncorrelated and oc-
cur at a random rate that is much less than one output per selected time interval, T, then for two sensors, 
NAR(AND) = (T/60)(NAR1)(NAR2) where T is in minutes and NAR1 and NAR2 are nuisance alarms per hour for 
sensor 1 and sensor 2, respectively. 
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• at the boundary (e.g., of a building or a security area) 
• within a room 
• at the object to be protected 
The designer of a good interior intrusion detection system considers the operational, physical, 
and environmental characteristics of the facility. Also, the designer should be familiar with: 
• the sensors that are available 
• how the sensors interact with the intruder and the environment 
• the physical principles of operation for each sensor 
The interior sensor system must support a balanced PPS. 
2.4.1.1.3 Alarm Assessment 
Assessment of perimeter alarms should be provided primarily by closed-circuit television 
(CCTV) coverage of each sensor sector displayed at a local alarm station monitored by security 
operators.  Secondary or supplemental assessment may be accomplished by the protective force 
(guards) in towers and roving patrols. 
Primary assessment of interior alarms can be accomplished by either CCTV displayed at a local 
alarm station or by guards only.  
The assessment system is composed of: 
• several cameras at remote sensor areas 
• a display monitor at the local end 
• various transmission, switching, and recording systems 
The major components include: 
• security operators who acknowledge and assess alarms 
• the camera and lens to convert the image of the physical scene into an electrical signal 
• the lighting system to illuminate the alarm location evenly with enough intensity for the 
camera and lens to function properly 
• the data transmission system to connect the remote cameras to the local video monitors 
that ensure that no undesirable effects are introduced into the video signal 
• a synchronization system to ensure that switchings are recording, clean, and free of verti-
cal roll 
• video switching equipment to connect multiple video signals from cameras with monitors 
and video recorders 
• a video recording system to produce a record of an event 
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• video monitors to convert a signal to a visual scene on the face of the output display 
• a video controller interface between the alarm sensor system and the alarm assessment 
system 
 
The video assessment system must be designed as a component of the total intrusion detection 
system. Interactions between the video system, intrusion sensors, and display system must be 
considered. 
2.4.1.1.4 Alarm Communication and Display 
An alarm communication and display system transmits alarm signals from intrusion detection 
sensors and displays the information to a security operator for action.  Although annunciator 
panels are easy to understand and maintain, they can be expensive, require a large amount of 
physical space for a large number of zones, and display only a limited amount of information.  A 
state-of-the-art-system uses computer technology and graphics to communicate alarm informa-
tion to the operator.  Characteristics of a good alarm communication system include: 
• fast reporting time 
• supervision of all data transmission cables 
• easy and quick discovery of single-point failures 
• isolation and control of sensors 
• expansion flexibility 
The designer of an alarm display system must decide: 
• what information to display 
• how to present the information 
• how the operator will communicate with the system 
• how to arrange the equipment at the operator work station 
An alarm communication system is an integrated system of people, procedures, and equipment 
and must be designed with the special needs and resources of the site in mind. 
2.4.1.1.5 Entry/Exit Control 
Entry control means allowing entry to authorized personnel and detecting the attempted entry of 
unauthorized personnel and materials.  The measures of effectiveness of entry control are 
throughput, imposter pass rate (i.e., false accept rate), and false rejection rate.  Throughput is de-
fined as the number of authorized personnel allowed access per unit time, assuming that all per-
sonnel who attempt entry are authorized for entrance.  Imposter pass or false accept rate is the 
rate at which false identities or credentials are allowed entry.  False rejection rate is the rate at 
which valid identities or credentials are rejected (i.e., entry is prohibited). 
Entry control systems consist of the hardware and procedures used to verify entry authorization 
and to detect contraband (for exit control).  Methods of personnel entry authorization include: 
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• credentials 
• personal identification number 
• automated personal identity verification 
Contraband consists of items such as unauthorized weapons, explosives, incendiaries, and tools.  
Methods of contraband detection include metal detectors, package searches, and explosives de-
tectors.  Special nuclear material detectors are not required at nuclear power plants, but are re-
quired at Category I fuel facilities.  (The purpose of special nuclear materials detectors used for 
exit control is to detect the unauthorized removal of nuclear material on persons, in packages, or 
in vehicles leaving a material access or protected area.)  Locks and seals are low technology 
techniques that have been successfully used for years to deny access to an area or to give indica-
tion that access has been gained.  An effective entry/exit control system: 
• cannot be easily bypassed 
• allows observation by the protective force (guards) 
• protects guards 
• accommodates peak loads 
• performs personnel and material control 
• blocks passage until personnel and material control are complete 
• is under surveillance by the central alarm station 
• provides secondary inspections for those who cannot pass the automated inspection 
• is designed for both entry and exit 
2.4.1.2 Delay 
Delay is the second function of a PPS.  It is the slowing down of adversary progress.  Delay can 
be accomplished by barriers,12 locks, and activated delays.  The protective force can be consid-
ered elements of delay if they are in fixed and well-protected positions.  The measure of delay 
effectiveness is the time required by the adversary (after detection) to bypass each delay element.  
Although the adversary may be delayed prior to detection, this delay is of no value to the effec-
tiveness of the PPS because it does not provide additional time to respond to the adversary. 
2.4.1.3 Response 
The response function consists of the actions taken by the protective force to prevent adversary 
success.  Response consists of interruption and neutralization.  Interruption is defined as a suffi-
cient number of response force personnel arriving at the appropriate location to stop the adver-
sary=s progress.  It includes the communication to the protection force of accurate information 
                                                 
12In 10 CFR 73.2 a physical barrier is defined as:  (1) Fences constructed of No. 11 American wire gauge, or heavier 
wire fabric, topped by three strands or more of barbed wire or similar material on brackets angled inward or outward 
between 30 and 45 degrees from the vertical, with an overall height of not less than eight feet, including the barbed 
topping; (2) Building walls, ceilings and floors constructed of stone, brick, cinder block, concrete, steel or compara-
ble materials (openings in which are secured by grates, doors, or covers of construction and fastening of sufficient 
strength such that the integrity of the wall is not lessened by any opening), or walls of similar construction, not part 
of a building, provided with a barbed topping described in paragraph (1) of this definition of a height of not less than 
8 ft; or (3) Any other physical obstruction constructed in a manner and of materials suitable for the purpose for 
which the obstruction is intended. 
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about adversary actions and the deployment of the response force.  The measure of response ef-
fectiveness is the time between receipt of a communication of adversary action and the neutrali-
zation of the adversary action. 
The effectiveness measures for response communication are the probability of accurate (intelli-
gible) communication and the time required to communicate.  The probability of communication 
having adequate intelligibility and the time required for communication are related as shown in 
Figure 2-5.  The time after information is initially transmitted may vary considerably depending 
on the method of communication.  After the initial period, the probability of valid communica-
tion begins to increase rapidly.  With each repeat communication, the probability of correct (i.e., 
adequate intelligibility) and current data being communicated is increased. 
Deployment describes the actions of the protective force from the time communication is re-
ceived until the force is in position to neutralize the adversary.  The effectiveness measure of this 
function is the probability of deployment to the adversary location and the time required to de-
ploy the response force. 
Neutralization is the act of stopping the adversary before his goal is accomplished.  The effec-
tiveness measure of this function is the response force engagement effectiveness and may be rep-
resented by the probability of neutralization (PN). 
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Figure 2-5.  Variation of probability of a valid communication with time. 
 29 
2.4.2 Physical Protection System Characteristics 
An effective PPS has several specific characteristics.  The effectiveness of the PPS functions of 
detection, delay, and response and their relationships were discussed previously.  In addition, all 
hardware elements of the system must be installed, maintained, and operated properly to function 
as intended. 
The procedures of the PPS must be compatible with the plant’s procedures.  Security, safety, and 
operational objectives must be accomplished at all times.  A PPS that has been well engineered 
will include the following: 
• protection-in-depth 
• minimum consequence of component failure 
• balanced protection 
These are discussed in the following subsections. 
2.4.2.1 Protection-in-Depth 
Protection-in-depth (analogous to the concept of defense-in-depth for safety in which multiple 
systems must be defeated before safety is compromised) means that to accomplish his goal, an 
adversary should be required to avoid or defeat a number of protective devices in sequence.13  
For example, an adversary might have to penetrate three separate barriers before gaining entry to 
a reactor control room.  The times to penetrate each of these barriers may not necessarily be 
equal and the effectiveness of each may be quite different, but each will require a separate and 
distinct act by the adversary as he moves along his path.  The effect produced on the adversary 
by a system that provides protection-in-depth will be: 
• to increase his uncertainty about the system 
• to require more extensive preparations prior to attacking the system 
• to create additional steps where the adversary may fail or abort his mission 
2.4.2.2 Minimum Consequence of Component Failure 
It is unlikely that a complex system will ever be developed and operated that does not experience 
some component failure during its lifetime.  Causes of component failure in a PPS are numerous 
and can range from environmental factors (which may be expected) to adversary actions beyond 
the scope of the threat used in the system design.  Although it is important to know the cause of 
component failure to restore the system to normal operation, it is more important that contin-
gency plans are provided so the system can continue to operate.  Requiring portions of these con-
tingency plans to be carried out automatically (so that redundant equipment automatically takes 
                                                 
13In the International Atomic Energy Agency publication Engineering Safety Aspects of the Protection of Nuclear 
Power Plants Against Sabotage published in 2007, the term “defence (sic) in depth” is used to describe the concept 
that defense-in-depth (against sabotage) involves cooperation and planning among those responsible for plant opera-
tions, safety, security, emergency preparedness, and other government agencies at all levels to provide protection 
against sabotage events.  Thus, protection-in-depth is analogous to “defence (sic) in depth” in that multiple layers 
must be defeated before the undesired event occurs.  
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over the function of disabled equipment) may be highly desirable in some cases.  Note that 
automatic actions may include administrative controls for response force personnel to respond 
given a specific component failure before the cause of the failure has been identified where spe-
cific component failure may be indicative of sabotage.  Backup power (secondary power supply) 
should be designed and implemented to ensure critical security systems continue to function as 
intended to maintain security system effectiveness.  Some component failures may require aid 
from sources outside of the facility to minimize the impact of the failure. 
2.4.2.3 Balanced Protection 
Balanced protection implies that no matter how an adversary attempts to accomplish his goal, he 
will encounter equivalently effective elements of the PPS.  Consider, for example, the barrier 
surface that typically surrounds a reactor control room.  This surface may consist of: 
• walls, floors, and ceilings of several types 
• doors of several types and equipment hatches in floors and ceilings 
• heating, ventilating, and air conditioning openings with various types of grills 
For a completely balanced system, the minimum time to penetrate, and bullet resistance of, each 
of these barriers would be equal, and the minimum probability of detecting penetration of each of 
these barriers would be equal.  However, complete balance, with respect to delay, is probably 
neither possible nor desirable.  Certain elements, such as walls, may be extremely resistant to 
penetration not because of physical protection requirements, but because of structural or safety 
requirements.  Door, hatch, and grille delays may be considerably less than wall delays and still 
be adequate to meet physical protection system objectives.  A balance between overdesigning 
and underdesigning, being conscious of resource availability, should be achieved.  For example, 
installing a simple hollow-core fire door intended as a barrier in a wall that is two-foot-thick re-
inforced concrete does not take advantage of the significant delay provided by the wall.  Like-
wise, installing a costly vault door that would take several minutes to penetrate with explosives 
does not produce balance if the wall composition is such that penetration by hand tools could be 
accomplished in a few seconds. 
Finally, features designed to protect against one form of threat should not be eliminated because 
they overprotect against another threat.  The objective should be to provide adequate protection 
against all threats on all possible paths and to maintain a balance with other considerations, such 
as cost, safety, and structural integrity. 
2.5 Analyze the Physical Protection System Design 
The fourth major activity in the development of a PPS design, as shown in Figure 2-2, is analyze 
PPS design.  The PPS design that has been developed to meet the objectives of the protection 
system (e.g., providing high assurance of protection against significant core damage and sabo-
tage of spent fuel) should be analyzed to determine the effectiveness of the design in meeting 
those objectives.  While this analysis can take one of two forms, quantitative or qualitative, the 
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preferred approach is a rigorous quantitative analysis.14  But an acceptable analysis method, ap-
plicable to design certification and combined license applicants, is described in Reference 1 (i.e., 
Nuclear Power Plant Security Assessment Format and Content Guide.  This analysis method 
utilizes both quantitative and qualitative elements.  The licensed NRC power reactor fleet utilizes 
this method. 
A PPS is a complex configuration of detection, delay, and response elements.  Using available 
tools and techniques, the PPS can be evaluated for its effectiveness.15  Such techniques identify 
system deficiencies, evaluate improvements, and perform cost versus system effectiveness com-
parisons.  The approach for analyzing the design of a PPS involves three activities: 
• pathway analysis (i.e., identification of potential adversary paths and associated effec-
tiveness measures) 
• neutralization analysis (i.e., estimating the effectiveness of the protection and/or response 
force in preventing the adversary for accomplishing his goal) 
• risk assessment (i.e., estimating the overall effectiveness of the PPS as a component of 
risk) 
These activities are briefly discussed in the following subsections. 
2.5.1 Pathway Analysis 
2.5.1.1 Adversary Paths 
Pathway analysis involves identifying and analyzing the paths (through a facility) that an adver-
sary might take during his theft or sabotage attempt (see Section 2.5.1.4 for a discussion on iden-
tifying potential paths).  An adversary path is an ordered series of actions against a target that, if 
completed, results in successful theft or sabotage.  Figure 2-6 illustrates a single sabotage path of 
an adversary who wishes to destroy a pump in a high security area.  Protection elements along 
the path will detect and delay the adversary.16  Figure 2-7 describes example security elements 
along the path. 
2.5.1.2 Effectiveness Measures 
The goal of an adversary is to complete a path with the least likelihood of being stopped by the 
PPS.  To achieve this goal, the adversary may attempt to minimize the time required to complete 
the path.  This strategy involves penetrating barriers with little regard to the probability of being 
detected.  If the adversary completes the path before guards can respond to interrupt his activi-
ties, he is successful.  Alternatively, the adversary may attempt to minimize detection with little 
                                                 
14A quantitative analysis can be performed when a PPS is designed to protect assets that, if lost, would result in un-
acceptably high consequences, even if the probability of an adversary attack is low.  
15These tools and techniques are applicable in the initial design of a PPS and are also appropriate for reevaluating 
the design as changes occur in the threat or the physical design of the plant being protected.  
16Remember, the function of detection includes not only sensor activation but also alarm communication and as-
sessment. 
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regard to the time required.  If the adversary completes the path without being detected, he is 
successful. 
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Figure 2-6. Example 
sabotage path. 
Figure 2-7.  Protection elements along the sabotage path. 
 
One measure of PPS effectiveness is the comparison of the minimum cumulative time delay 
along the path (TMIN) compared to the guard response time (TG).  Guard response time includes 
the total time needed to communicate the assessed alarm to the response force, the time needed 
by the response force to obtain the appropriate response force tools (e.g., weapons), and the time 
needed by the response force to travel in adequate numbers to the location where the adversaries 
can be interrupted.17  An adequate PPS provides enough delay for the guards to respond.  Figure 
2-8 illustrates the minimum time measure of effectiveness.  For an effective system, TG must be 
less than TMIN.  System improvements are achieved by decreasing TG or by adding protection 
elements with more delay to increase TMIN.  The disadvantage of this measure of effectiveness is 
that no consideration of detection is involved.  Delay without prior detection is not meaningful; 
the response force must be alerted in order to respond and interrupt the adversary.  Therefore, the 
minimum time measure alone is not the best measure of system effectiveness. 
Another measure of effectiveness is the cumulative probability of detecting the adversary before 
his mission is completed.  An adequate protection system provides a high probability of detec-
tion.  Figure 2-9 illustrates the cumulative probability of detection measure of effectiveness.  For 
an effective system, PMIN (minimum cumulative detection along path) must be an acceptable 
value.  The disadvantage is that no consideration of delay is involved.  Detection without suffi-
cient subsequent delay is not meaningful; the response force may have insufficient time to inter-
rupt the adversary. 
                                                 
17In this context, interrupt means that the adversary’s progress is stopped by the response force such that if the ad-
versaries do not stop the activity they are conducting and engage (i.e., fight) the response force, they can be killed. 
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Path
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of Path
Minimum Delay by a 
Protection Element
Minimum Delay Along Path, TMIN
Guard Response Time, TG  
Figure 2-8.  Minimum time as a measure of effectiveness. 
Start of 
Path
Completion 
of Path
Minimum Probability of Detection 
by a Protection Element
Minimum Cumulative Probability of Detection 
Along the Path, PMIN  
Figure 2-9.  Cumulative probability of detection as a measure of effectiveness. 
Neither delay time nor cumulative probability of detection alone is the best measure of effective-
ness.  A better measure of effectiveness is “timely detection.”  Timely detection is the minimum 
cumulative probability of detecting the adversary while there is enough time remaining for the 
response force to interrupt18 the adversary.  Figure 2-10 illustrates the timely detection measure 
of effectiveness.19  The delay elements along the path determine the point by which the adversary 
must be detected.  That point is where the minimum delay along the remaining portion of the 
path (TR) just exceeds the guard response time (TG); i.e., the sum of the individual delay times 
associated with each delay element just exceeds TG.20  
                                                 
18See previous footnote. 
19Here point estimates are used for detection probabilities and times.  More sophisticated analyses consider the un-
certainty in these variables. 
20It is recognized that in an actual application one strives to have TR do more than “just exceed” TG (to account for 
all manner of uncertainties).  However, for the sake of defining the concept of the critical detection point, TR just 
needs to “exceed” TG. 
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Figure 2-10.  Timely detection as a measure of effectiveness. 
This point is the critical detection point (CDP).  Minimum cumulative probability of interruption 
(PI) is the cumulative probability of detection from the start of the path up to the CDP.  PI is used 
to represent this value to differentiate it from the total cumulative probability of detection be-
cause it only considers detection up to the CDP.21 
2.5.1.3 Critical Path 
Typically there are many adversary paths into a facility.  The critical path is the path with the 
lowest probability of interruption.22  The critical path characterizes the effectiveness of the pro-
tection system in detecting, delaying, and interrupting the adversary.  Because the critical path in 
effect defines one component of the overall PPS effectiveness (i.e., PI), it is important to assure 
that all potential paths into a facility have been identified.  A technique for identifying the paths 
is presented in the next subsection. 
2.5.1.4 Adversary Sequence Diagram 
There are three basic steps in creating an adversary sequence diagram (ASD) for a specific site.  
These include: 
• Modeling the facility by separating it into adjacent physical areas 
• Defining protection layers and path elements between the adjacent areas 
• Showing path segments between the areas through the path elements 
                                                 
21To calculate PI, an assumption is made that the adversary will try to minimize detection before the CDP and mini-
mize delay after the CDP. 
22The critical path may differ depending on the adversary (i.e., the threat and associated capabilities) and his objec-
tive (e.g., theft versus sabotage).  Remember, the adversary may involve an insider (one who works at the facility or 
has access to the facility), and as such, an insider may start at any point along the path. 
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2.5.1.4.1 Physical Areas 
The ASD models a facility by separating it into adjacent physical areas. (See Figure 2-11 for an 
example.)  The ASD represents areas by rectangles.  The names of these areas can be changed to 
model a specific site. 
 
Target 
Enclosure
Target
Controlled Room
Controlled Building
Protected Area
Limited Area
Off Site
 
Figure 2-11.  Adjacent physical areas—example. 
 
2.5.1.4.2 Protection Layers and Path Elements 
The ASD models a PPS by identifying protection layers between adjacent areas (Figure 2-12).  
Each protection layer consists of a number of path elements (Figure 2-13).  Path elements (PEs) 
are the basic building blocks of a PPS.  Examples of the types of PEs and target locations used in 
an ASD include: 
• Path Elements: 
– DUC - Duct 
– EMX - Emergency Exit 
– FEN - Fenceline 
– GAT - Gateway 
– ISO - Isolation Zone 
– DOR - Personnel Doorway 
– PER - Personnel Portal 
– SUR - Surface 
– VEH - Vehicle Portal 
– WND - Window 
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• Target Locations: 
– FLV - Floor Vault 
– GBX - Glovebox 
– OPN - Open Location 
– TNK - Storage Tank 
 
 
Off Site
Protection Layer
Limited Area
Protection Layer
Protected Area
Protection Layer
Controlled Building
Protection Layer
Controlled Room
Protection Layer
Target Enclosure
Protection Layer
Target  
Figure 2-12.  Depiction of protection layers between adjacent areas. 
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(Duct)
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(Door)
PE
(Wall)
PE
(Roof)
Protected Area
Controlled Building
 
Figure 2-13. Depiction of protection layer consisting of path elements be-
tween two areas. 
2.5.1.4.3 Path Segments 
The ASD represents path segments between areas, through the PEs by lines.  Each PE consists of 
path segments to which delay and detection values are assigned.  Both entry and exit parts of a 
path can be modeled (Figure 2-14).  The entry part is from offsite to the target, and the exit is 
from the target back to offsite.  A given PE may be traversed once, either on entry or exit, or it 
may be traversed twice, on entry and in the opposite direction on exit. 
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PE PE PE PE
Physical Area
Physical Area
Input Path 
Segment
Output Path 
Segment  
Figure 2-14.  Path elements—input and output path segments. 
2.5.1.4.4 Basic (Generic) Adversary Sequence Diagram 
The basic (or generic) ASD is given in Figure 2-15.  The adversary attempts to sequentially de-
feat an element in each protection layer as he traverses a path through the facility to the target.  
The ASD represents all of the credible paths that an adversary might take to reach a target. 
Off Site
Limited Area
Protected Area
Controlled Building
Controlled Room
Target Enclosure
Target
Physical Areas
Protection Layer
Path Element
Path Segments
Target Location
 
Figure 2-15.  Basic adversary sequence diagram. 
For a sabotage analysis, only the entry paths would be evaluated, and the path elements would be 
assumed to be traversed in only one direction.  For a theft analysis, the ASD shown would be 
considered to be traversed twice—on entry to the target and on exit from the target. 
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Sometimes it will be necessary to deviate from the orderly sequence of physical areas and pro-
tection layers of the generic ASD in order to create an accurate site-specific ASD.  There are two 
occasions in ASD development when this is necessary: 
• jump 
• bypass 
A jump is used to model a site element that does not directly connect to the adjacent area shown 
on the generic ASD.  For example, if there were a wall that was common to the controlled build-
ing and to the target enclosure, then a jump would exist.  A path would exist that would allow the 
adversary to move from the controlled building directly into the target enclosure (see Figure 
2-16). 
 
Figure 2-16.  Adversary sequence diagram with a jump. 
A bypass is used to model the absence of a protection layer.  If all the path elements in a layer 
between two physical areas are removed (or do not exist), then a bypass exists (see Figure 2-17). 
The ASD, then, serves as a useful tool to represent all the detection and delay elements in a PPS.  
By graphically representing all the protection elements by layer, the analyst has a simple picture 
of adversary paths into a facility and subsequently to the target(s). 
2.5.2 Neutralization Analysis 
2.5.2.1 Introduction 
The majority of the following discussion on neutralization analysis was taken, with some slight 
modifications, from [Ref. 6]. 
 
Off Site
Limited Area
Protected Area
Controlled Building
Controlled Room
Target Enclosure
Target
Path Element Jump
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Figure 2-17.  Adversary sequence diagram with bypass. 
 
The PPS at a nuclear facility consists of detection, delay, and response functions.  The purpose of 
the response function is to render the adversary incapable of completing his goal.  The response 
function at a facility can be characterized by collecting the appropriate data.  However, the ana-
lyst must still develop some measure of effectiveness for response.  For response, the measure of 
effectiveness is probability of neutralization (PN).  
The determination of this probability requires information about the response forces, the threat, 
and the PPS, as well as the choice of a methodology for estimating PN.  The following subsec-
tions identify the necessary information for determining the probability of neutralization and 
identify approaches and/or tools for estimating PN.  It should be noted that while approaches and 
tools exist to estimate PN, no acceptable standardized methodology exists for calculating PN. 
2.5.2.2 Terminology and Definitions 
Before attempting to determine the effectiveness of a response force in neutralizing an adversary 
force, some terms must be defined.  An engagement is defined as an event where two opposing 
forces, such as the response force and an adversary force, use weapons and tactics in an attempt 
to achieve their respective goals.  Obviously, because many random variables are involved in the 
engagement, there are many possible outcomes.  A win is defined as one of the following out-
comes of the engagement: the adversary force is killed, is captured, or abandons the attack and 
flees. 
Probability of neutralization is defined as: 
PN = N(wins) / N(engagements) 
Off Site
Limited Area
Protected Area
Controlled Building
Controlled Room
Target Enclosure
Target
Bypass
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The number of engagements in the denominator is a statistically significant number in accor-
dance with the Law of Large Numbers.  This law states that as the number of times in which an 
event is repeated becomes larger and larger, the proportion of successful outcomes will tend to 
come closer and closer to the actual probability of success.  In using the defining equation in an 
analysis process, it should be kept in mind that all engagements must have the same initial condi-
tions and that there are only two possible outcomes per engagement: win or loss. 
There are two types of processes that can determine the outcome of an event: deterministic or 
stochastic. 
1. A deterministic process is one in which results or outcomes are causally determined ei-
ther by preceding events or by natural laws.  When an event is governed by deterministic 
processes, the outcome only needs to be calculated once because, given the same initial 
conditions, the event will always have the same outcome.  
2. Unfortunately, actual engagements are stochastic processes.  A stochastic process is one 
in which various random outcomes are possible because the process involves random 
variables. The probability of casualty (PC) attributed to a weapon is an example of a ran-
dom variable in an engagement.  Figure 2-18 illustrates the probability of casualty versus 
range for a generic handgun (HG) and a generic semi-automatic rifle (SAR). 
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Figure 2-18.  Probability of casualty vs. range. 
 
2.5.2.3 Threat Data 
Neutralization analysis requires data on the threat, the response, and the PPS.  Threat data in-
clude threat type and numbers, targets, goals, and other information provided in the DBT.  In-
formation about the threat necessary for PN analysis is summarized in Table 2-1. 
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Table 2-1.  Threat Posture Data 
Data Needs 
Target 
Strategy 
Type 
Number 
Special tactics: 
• ambush 
• diversion 
• vehicle bomb 
Weapons Body armor 
Transport Communications 
Training Path delay in 
Equipment Target task time 
 Path delay out 
 
 
 
2.5.2.4 Response Force Data 
Similar, but more detailed, information is required about the response forces to determine PN.  In 
addition to response force posture data, listed in Table 2-2, the rules of engagement and order of 
battle for each target must be known.  The response force posture data contains information 
about weapons, strategies, numbers of guards, transport, response times, etc., for each target. 
 
Table 2-2.  Response Force Posture Data 
Data Needs 
Strategy Body armor  
Guard types Communications 
Numbers 
Weapons 
Locations 
Transport 
Tactics 
Training 
Equipment 
Response times: 
• alarm communication 
• assessment 
• deployment order 
• preparation 
• travel 
• deployment 
 
Rules of engagement include the conditions and procedures under which various elements of the 
response force must operate, including when the use of deadly force might be authorized.   For 
the purposes of PN analysis, it is sound practice to collect sufficient information to construct a 
table for each target similar to that shown in Table 2-3.  As shown in the table, the rules of en-
gagement for each response group or type of responder should include a strategy and an objec-
tive, as well as tactics and techniques. 
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Table 2-3.  Rules of Engagement 
Response Strategy Objective Tactic Technique 
Target posts     
Other posts     
Patrols     
Tactical teams     
Local Law Enforcement Agencies 
(LLEAs) 
    
Other     
 
Strategies for Table 2-3 could include, but may not be limited to: 
• deterrence 
• denial 
• containment 
• pursuit 
• recapture/recovery 
Each strategy should have an objective, which may include: 
• observation 
• delay 
• interruption 
• neutralization 
• arrest 
• backup 
A strategy is implemented through the use of tactics.  Tactics are very dependent on the facility, 
competent authority regulations, and the organization that trains and controls the response.  Tac-
tics can include: 
• engage at will 
• engage on command 
• engage on necessity 
• coordinated engagement 
Finally, there are the techniques that the response force uses with each tactic-strategy combina-
tion.  Techniques may include, in increasing order of force: 
• verbal command 
• non-lethal force 
• deadly force 
• other 
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The order of battle as defined here is the temporal order in which individual guards or groups of 
responders are encountered by the adversary.  The encounters may occur either as the adversary 
traverses the path to and from the target or as successive responders arrive at a specific battle site 
and engage the adversary.  The order of battle is target-specific, so it is recommended that a table 
such as Table 2-4 be completed for each target along the most vulnerable path of each target. 
 
Table 2-4.  Example Order of Battle 
Target: Vault Condition: Offshift 
Response Type Numbers Time 
1st Portal guards 2 0 sec 
2nd Interior post 1 30 sec 
3rd Foot patrol 1 60 sec 
4th Special Response Team 5 180 sec 
5th LLEA 4 30 min 
 
2.5.2.5 Neutralization Analysis Methods 
Methods for determining PN can be grouped into the following categories: 
• expert judgment (opinion), including tabletop analyses 
• simple numerical calculations 
• complex numerical simulations (computerized war games) 
• physical engagement exercises (force-on-force) 
• actual engagements 
Each category has its advantages and disadvantages, primarily in terms of time, cost, and accu-
racy. 
Expert judgment is the opinion of one or more subject matter experts about the effectiveness of 
the response forces.  This opinion must be tempered by the background and experience of the 
expert, knowledge of the response forces at the facility, and knowledge of the threat.  Expert 
judgment is difficult to verify and, unless the same expert is involved in all of the estimations, 
results can vary from site to site and even target to target.  Further, if two or more experts dis-
agree, there is no way to tell if the PN is valid. 
Tabletop (or sand table or military map) analysis involves using a map or site schematic with ei-
ther icons or figurines to represent combat elements.  This method has been used in warfare at 
least since Roman Legion times.  Commanders can place the icons in various positions on the 
map and debate the outcome of possible engagements.  A crucial element for tabletop analysis is 
the method used to determine the outcome of engagements.  Expert judgment, data tables, or a 
set of rules with simple numerical calculations are the most common methods of determining 
outcomes of engagements.  A sophisticated tabletop analysis method could include both quanti-
tative and qualitative elements such as: timeline analyses, blast analyses, calculations of prob-
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ability of detection, and a determination that PN is adequate by showing an adequate number of 
response force members, adequately armed and trained, can reach protected positions in a timely 
manner to neutralize a DBT attack.23 
Simple numerical calculations are often used in place of or to augment expert judgment determi-
nations.  Simple numerical calculations include data tables, curve-fitted equations, continuous 
time Markov chain (CTMC) methods, and Monte Carlo methods. Figure 2-19 is an example of a 
data table. The figure presents a comparison of a curve-fit equation with the results of a more 
complex CTMC solution. 
Probability of Neutralization
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Figure 2-19.  Curve-fit equation and Markov chain solution. 
 
Because actual engagements are stochastic processes, the analysis of an engagement must in-
volve a solution technique that incorporates probabilities. Two preferred methods are the Markov 
Chain method and Monte Carlo simulations. 
The Markov Chain method is a path-independent stochastic process in which probabilities of oc-
currence of future states depend only on the present state or the immediately preceding state.  
This process is used in [Ref. 7] to develop a state transition diagram and solve the resulting time-
dependent transitions from initial state to all probable outcomes of interest.  The general devel-
opment and solution of CTMC is discussed in [Ref. 8].  Figure 2-20 illustrates the state transition 
diagram, with the transition rates listed as Greek variables between the various states. 
                                                 
23This method of conducting tabletop analyses has been used by NRC power reactor licensees to show that the high 
assurance objective of protection can be met for certain conditions.  A baseline inspection program that assesses 
protective strategy components and a force-on-force exercise program are both also used by the NRC to ensure li-
censees are maintaining the high assurance objective. 
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Figure 2-20.  Markov chain state transition diagram. 
The Analytic System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security pathway analysis 
computer modeling tool has a Neutralization Module [Ref. 9] and it is an example of a numerical 
method based on Markov chains.  This computer methodology uses probability of kill (PK) data 
for various weapons and analysts= descriptions of firing posture, exposure, and other factors to 
simulate engagements in a manner similar to battles fought in the 1700s; that is, all the combat-
ants stand in a line and fire at each other.  A Markov chain is constructed to determine PN as a 
function of successive volleys fired by both sides.  The main advantages of such simple numeri-
cal calculations are (1) low cost and (2) reproducible results, as long as the same input data are 
used. 
Monte Carlo methods involve the use of random sampling techniques.  Monte Carlo computer 
simulations are used to obtain approximate solutions to mathematical or physical problems in-
volving a range of variables, each of which has a calculated probability of being the solution.  
Table 2-5 presents an example of a Monte Carlo process for determining the outcome of individ-
ual engagements.  Two coins are flipped to determine the results of a guard and a threat each fir-
ing one shot at the other.  A “head” means that the shooter missed his target, and a “tail” means 
that the target was killed. Thus the implied probability of casualty of each weapon is 50%.  One 
possible outcome, number 1, is that both shooters miss. In this case, the coins are flipped again, 
representing a second shot. The process is repeated until the engagement outcome obtained is 
either possibility 2, 3, or 4. If a statistically significant number of engagements are evaluated in 
this manner, and all wins and losses are recorded, the probability of neutralization for this spe-
cific type of engagement can be calculated using the defined formula presented above. It is inter-
esting to note that even though the implied weapon probability of casualty is 50%, the probabil-
ity of neutralization for this engagement is 66.7%. 
Computerized engagement simulations are representative of the third category.  The Joint Con-
flict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) software tool (developed for the Department of Defense 
by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory) [Ref. 10] will be used as an example.  In JCATS, 
modeled adversary entities attack the facility while guard entities try to prevent the adversaries 
from completing their sabotage or theft scenarios.  The first step in running JCATS is the devel-
opment of a three-dimensional model of the facility.  This model includes physical objects (e.g., 
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Table 2-5.  Monte Carlo Simulation of 1 vs. 1 Engagement 
Outcome 1 2 3 4 
Combatant guard threat guard threat guard threat guard threat 
Toss Result H H T H H T T T 
Represents misses misses hits misses misses hits hits hits 
Shot Result alive alive alive dead dead alive dead dead 
Net Result Shoot again win loss win 
 
fences, buildings, and towers), personnel entities (e.g., guard and adversary), and equipment (ve-
hicles, armament, explosives, and tools).  All personnel entities are controlled by human opera-
tors.  The operators that control the guard forces communicate through headsets so that they can 
coordinate their movements with each other.  The adversary force operators also communicate 
through headsets.  An operator can operate a single entity or multiple entities during a simula-
tion.  Guards and adversaries interact with each other as they come in view based on line of 
sight.  When an entity uses a weapon to try to kill another entity, the code uses probability of 
hit/probability of kill (PH/PK) tables for the weapon to calculate the odds that a shot at a particu-
lar distance would be able to hit another entity.  Simulations end when either the adversaries 
have completed their tasks or the guards have been able to neutralize the adversaries.  
Simulated physical engagements are known as force-on-force (FOF) exercises.  Force-on-force 
exercises are not actually evaluation methodologies but rather should be considered training ex-
ercises or validation exercises.  At a real facility, FOF requires four groups: mock adversaries, 
mock responders, referees (controllers), and the on-duty response force personnel.  These exer-
cises are expensive in terms of both personnel and planning, are usually run only a few times at a 
facility, and can produce skewed results.24 Statistically, there are usually not enough engage-
ments to produce a probability of system win with a high confidence level. 
Actual engagements have one big advantage: the outcome is a known fact.  Obviously, compari-
son of actual engagements results with either live fire or simulation exercises can be complex 
and costly; however, such comparisons prove the validity of simulation techniques. 
2.5.3 Risk Analysis 
The underlying premise of this chapter is that the design and evaluation of a PPS must be done 
from a system standpoint.  In this way, all components of detection, delay, and response can be 
properly weighted according to their contributions to the PPS as a whole.  At a high level (i.e., 
the decision-maker or site management level), the effectiveness of a PPS (and thus the design 
requirements necessary to achieve that effectiveness) must be balanced against available re-
sources.  Without a methodical, defined, analytical assessment, the PPS might waste valuable 
resources on unnecessary protection or, worse yet, fail to provide adequate protection at critical 
points of the facility. 
                                                 
24However, it should be recognized that drills exercising several elements of a PPS and limited scope performance 
tests exercising one element of a PPS are less costly and provide valuable methods for measuring PPS effectiveness. 
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In evaluating the effectiveness of a PPS, the risk associated with the facility from malevolent ac-
tivities is given by: 
R = FA * [1 - (PI * PN)] * C 
where: 
 R = Risk to society of an adversary gaining access to, or stealing, nuclear material. 
 FA = Frequency of adversary attack.  It is very difficult to determine what this value should 
be.  Clearly, simple use of past history to estimate this value may not be appropriate 
given current understanding of today’s threat environment. 
 PI = Probability of interruption.  The probability that the defined adversary will be inter-
rupted by the response force in time to stop the adversary from accomplishing his ob-
jectives. 
 PN = Probability of neutralization.  For a given adversary and response force given interrup-
tion has occurred, the probability that the response force will defeat the adversary in an 
engagement (i.e., prevent the adversary from accomplishing his objective). 
 C = Consequence associated with the loss of the targets the PPS is designed to protect.  For 
a nuclear power plant, the consequence is typically associated with a radiological re-
lease.  Other consequence measures may be used.  The appropriate consequence meas-
ure to be used in the PPS risk calculation is established by the NRC. 
Typically during the design of PPS, the assumption is made that an attack occurs.  Thus the risk 
equation becomes: 
CR = [1 - (PI * PN)] * C 
where: 
 CR = Conditional risk (i.e., the risk given an attack). 
The term PI * PN is typically referred to as the probability of system effectiveness (PE) and repre-
sents the probability that the PPS prevents the consequence given an attack. 
The focus of the PPS design process is on maximizing PE. 
2.6 Is Design Acceptable? 
At this point in the PPS design and evaluation process, the risk associated with a particular de-
sign is known.  The question that must be answered is whether the level of risk associated with 
the design is acceptable.  This requires that the risk be compared against a decision metric.  If the 
risk is less than the decision metric, then the design is acceptable and no further work is neces-
sary.  If the risk associated with the design is not less than the decision metric, then the PPS 
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should be reexamined to determine those areas that, if strengthened (i.e., enhanced), would allow 
the risk associated with the revised PPS to be acceptable.25 
The decision metic for NRC-licensed nuclear power plants is “Does the risk associated with the 
PPS meet the high assurance objective of protection?” 
 
 
                                                 
25Since the PPS design and analysis process presented in this report is expected to be used in the design of physical 
security at a new plant, the designer should already be aware of the risk decision metric and should continue iterat-
ing on the PPS design until the risk is acceptable. 
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3. ANALYTICAL TOOLS 
There are a number of analytical tools available to the designer/analyst that can be used to evalu-
ate the proposed physical protection system (PPS) for a facility design.  Each of these tools has 
its strengths and weaknesses and is intended to provide the user with different information.  
These tools may be used independently or in combination to evaluate PPS effectiveness.  The 
manner in which these tools are used will depend on what measure is used to determine PPS ef-
fectiveness. 
Two major categories of tools exist.  The first deals with pathway analysis and the second deals 
with neutralization.  The intent of the following sections is to provide a summary description of 
some of the major tools available to an analyst.  One should not consider the list of tools exhaus-
tive.  
3.1 Tools That May Be Used in Pathway Analysis 
As discussed in Section 2.5.1, pathway analysis involves identifying and analyzing the paths 
(through a facility) that an adversary might take during his theft or sabotage attempt.  Given the 
complex nature of commercial nuclear power plants, it is expected that a computerized pathway 
analysis tool would be most useful in identifying the most vulnerable paths (i.e., the paths most 
likely to lead to adversary success).  The next five subsections identify tools that may be used to 
identify and/or analyze adversary paths.  The final subsection identifies a tool that helps an ana-
lyst estimate delay times not included in an access delay database. 
3.1.1 Analytic System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security 
The Analytic System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security (ASSESS) software 
is an integrated software package for identifying adversary pathways and evaluating system ef-
fectiveness against theft or sabotage of special nuclear material by a spectrum of adversaries:  
outsiders, insiders, and an insider colluding with outsiders.  The probability of detection for each 
nonviolent insider adversary type is calculated using a reference database of adversary attributes, 
defeat methods, strategies, and detection performance.  Probability of interruption (for theft or 
sabotage) is calculated for an outsider threat spectrum of terrorists, criminals, psychotics, and 
extremists.  (Note: ASSESS can be used to estimate the probability of neutralization of violent 
adversaries using the small force engagement attrition model included in the code thus allowing 
one to calculate a probability of system win for theft or sabotage.  In addition, a probability of 
system win can be calculated for uncorrelated handoff of theft material by various insiders in 
collusion with outsiders.) 
To enquire about a copy of the software, contact the Office of Technology, U.S. Department of 
Energy (DOE). 
3.1.2 Adversary Time-Line Analysis System 
The Adversary Time-Line Analysis System (ATLAS) is a software program used to compute the 
most vulnerable paths for attacks by both an outsider adversary and a violent insider.  The most 
vulnerable paths are computed in two different ways.  The first minimizes probability of inter-
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ruption (PI).  This is called the critical detection point (CDP) approach, because it is based on 
locating the CDP.  The second minimizes delay after the practical detection point (PDP).  These 
two analyses are complementary analysis approaches.26 
Another analysis feature identifies elements that are critical to the overall protection system ef-
fectiveness.  Critical elements are defined as protection elements that, if individually degraded to 
a critical performance level on entry, will reduce significantly the probability of system effec-
tiveness (PE). 
To enquire about a copy of the software, contact the Office of Technology, U.S. DOE. 
3.1.3 Systematic Analysis of Vulnerability to Intrusion 
The Systematic Analysis of Vulnerability to Intrusion (SAVI) program is Windows-based soft-
ware that can be used to determine the optimal path for the adversary to take to attack the facil-
ity.  It is composed of two main modules; the Facility module and the Outsider module. 
The SAVI Facility module is used to construct an ASD as described in Section 2.5.1.4.  The 
SAVI Facility module contains an array of generic protection element types like fences, win-
dows, gates, doors, and walls that can be configured to model appropriate detection, delay, and 
response safeguards.  A database of delay times as well as detection values that are based on per-
formance testing against adversaries with various attributes is provided in SAVI.  These default 
values may be used or, if the user has specific data, allows the user to modify the detection or 
delay values.  Once an ASD is finished, the file is saved and the SAVI Facility module is closed. 
The SAVI Outsider module is then used to analyze the facility.  The user specifies the threat type 
(how the adversary is armed and what tools he carries), the response strategy (denial or contain-
ment), the attack method (force/stealth or deceit), and the state of the system (dayshift or off shift 
operations).  SAVI then calculates the detection and delay values for each protection element by 
analyzing all attack methods for the threat and selects the minimum detection and delay values 
for each element.  For a given response force time, SAVI will calculate the facility=s most vul-
nerable path.  The algorithm first determines the CDP (for each path) and then calculates PI.  The 
SAVI software was developed for the Department of Energy by Sandia National Laboratories 
and Apogen Technology (formerly SEA, Inc.) [Ref. 11]. 
To enquire about a copy of the software, contact the Office of Technology, U.S. DOE. 
3.1.4 Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption 
The Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption (EASI) tool is an Excel spreadsheet that can be 
used to calculate PI for a single path [Ref. 2].  The user constructs a sequence of tasks along an 
adversary path that takes the adversary from offsite to completing the act of sabotage or theft.  
The data that the code needs is the mean and standard deviation of the delay time needed to ac-
complish each task, the probability of detection for any alarm that may be triggered along the 
path by the adversary, the probability of (guard) communication, and the mean and standard de-
                                                 
26 The primary approach is the CDP approach.  The PDP approach may identify paths that the CDP approach may 
not.  A PDP analysis should never be performed without also performing comparable CDP analyses. 
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viation of the response force time.  Once all the data have been entered, the code calculates PI for 
the path. 
The EASI software can be downloaded from the web at http://books.elsevier.com/companions/ 
0750673672/. 
3.1.5 Vulnerability of Integrated Security Analysis 
The Vulnerability of Integrated Security Analysis (VISA) methodology [Ref. 12] is a tabletop 
analysis technique that utilizes the expert judgment of the members of the vulnerability analysis 
team and any performance data (e.g., probability of detection for a specific sensor) that are avail-
able to the team to analyze the effectiveness of a PPS.  The process is step-dependent, meaning 
that developed scenarios, including the identified paths the adversaries take, are broken down 
into individual steps, evaluated as to the probabilities of detection, assessment, interruption, and 
neutralization (as assigned by the team), and then scored.  The VISA methodology can be used 
on its own for a quick analysis of a facility or it can be used in conjunction with other tools (e.g., 
ASSESS).  As with any tabletop analysis technique, care should be taken to ensure that the 
analysis is comprehensive (i.e., analysis of all threats to and paths into a facility have been exam-
ined) if a total PPS effectiveness analysis is being performed. 
Copies may be obtained from the NRC staff. 
3.1.6 Access Delay Knowledge-Based System 
The Access Delay Knowledge-Based System (ADKBS) is a software analysis tool that was de-
veloped to assist in estimating penetration delay times for single or multiple barriers.  The 
ADKBS software was prepared to supplement the database used by the ATLAS program and 
other currently applied access delay technologies.  The primary purpose of ADKBS is to develop 
penetration delay time estimates for single or multiple barriers and/or attack methods not specifi-
cally addressed by the database alone.  It generates these estimates by taking into account exist-
ing barrier delay information, rate data, and the installation circumstances of the barrier.  The 
ADKBS software is designed to provide a central source of penetration times and supporting in-
formation for barriers for protection system effectiveness evaluations.  The ADKBS software is 
also intended to assist the user in identifying options for upgrading existing access delay ele-
ments and to define advanced concepts for new or replacement elements with improved penetra-
tion times. 
To enquire about a copy of the software, contact the Office of Technology, U.S. DOE. 
3.2 Tools That May Be Used to Estimate Probability of Neutralization  
The following subsections provide a brief discussion on a select set of neutralization tools.  
These tools can be used to produce estimates of PN or may be used to provide input to other 
tools; however the reader should be aware that there is no acceptable standard as to how PN 
should be estimated (calculated). 
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3.2.1 Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation 
The Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) software is a tool used to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of a protective force to defend against a predetermined adversary attack objective.  Be-
cause JCATS is a resource-intensive, man-in-the-loop simulation, the scenario(s) evaluated with 
JCATS should be considered worst-case as determined by other less costly analyses.  When 
combined with subject matter experts and tabletop evaluations, JCATS provides an effective 
means for estimating engagement outcomes and validating security system effectiveness. 
JCATS was developed for the Department of Defense by Lawrence Livermore National Labora-
tory to provide a realistic, stress-filled, simulated urban combat training environment and has 
been adapted by the DOE to model its facilities and specific adversary capabilities. 
JCATS simulates the entire combat environment (buildings, vehicles, barriers, combatants, 
weapons, explosives, etc.) and uses multiple players to control assigned combat systems and re-
sources during the simulation exercise.  These combat systems include teams of combatants 
called units and ground/air mobile platforms armed with direct and indirect fire weapons.  The 
key functional areas modeled in the simulation are: 
• movement and individually controlled combat in and around detailed buildings 
• movement in and around buildings 
• clearing, occupying, and reinforcing buildings 
• movement of vehicles and units, to include mounting and dismounting vehicles 
• target acquisition using a variety of sensing techniques 
• direct fire engagements between combat units 
• fratricide 
• some human factors (e.g., fatigue, suppression) that affect performance 
• environmental factors (e.g., weather, terrain) that affect movement and line-of-sight ac-
quisition 
• indirect fire 
• barriers 
JCATS simulations require data for these key functional areas. 
An important aspect of JCATS is that the outcomes of individual engagement events are based 
on hit and kill probabilities in the form of Ph/Pk tables.  Each engagement event outcome is de-
termined stochastically by extracting the event probability from the Ph/Pk table based on event 
time battlefield conditions and then drawing a random number against that event occurrence 
probability to establish event success or failure.  These individual stochastic results affect the 
battlefield condition for the next time-step and in turn determine the overall win/loss outcome of 
the simulated engagement.  This randomness reflects the battlefield environment and highlights 
the importance of synchronization and timing on the overall outcome of the battle.   
For the purpose of estimating PN for worst-case scenarios, each engagement is run in JCATS 
several times to accumulate overall battle win/loss samples.  When combined with appropriate 
subject matter experts (e.g., those knowledgeable of JCATS=s strengths and weaknesses) and 
more detailed results regarding the severity of the engagement win/loss, results from the JCATS 
 53 
exercises (i.e., scenarios) can be used to estimate the effectiveness of the physical protection 
force in neutralizing the adversary force (i.e., PN). 
3.2.2 Tabletop Assessment Methodology 
There are several tabletop methodologies and procedural tools for evaluating protection system 
effectiveness (or estimating potential for neutralization) against specified threats.  There are dif-
ferent variations of these methodologies but for the most part these methodologies are applied in 
a logical, sequenced manner that considers the adversary threat, target attractiveness, malevolent 
adversary acts, and the potential consequences of adversary success.  This assessment also 
evaluates the existing security system and its ability to protect assets, which include personnel, 
facilities, equipment, and procedures.  A major activity also includes determining a security 
force=s capability to effectively respond, interrupt, and neutralize an adversary attack, which is 
determined by subject matter experts who develop and analyze various scenarios.  Timeline 
analysis using pathway analysis tools supplemented by blast analyses, delay times of barriers, 
and calculations of detection probability (i.e., PD) can be used to enhance tabletop methodologies. 
3.2.3 Force-on-Force Exercises 
Force-on-force (FOF) exercises (i.e., simulated physical engagements) are not actually PN 
evaluation methodologies—they should be considered training exercises or validation exercises.  
However, if well-designed and conducted, they may provide insights about the protective force 
that may be used by other tools/techniques for estimating PN.  One major reason why FOF exer-
cises should not be used to directly estimate PN is that these exercises are usually run only a few 
times at a facility (they are expensive in terms of both personnel and planning); thus, there are 
usually not enough engagements to produce a probability of system win (i.e., neutralization) with 
a high confidence level. 
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4. PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM DESIGN: BEST PRACTICES 
4.1 Risk Assessment 
As stated in Chapter 2, conditional risk assessments are conducted to determine the overall effec-
tiveness of a physical protection system (PPS).  There are a number of risk assessment methods 
available to analysts to determine system effectiveness and subsequent risk.  The most thorough 
of these accomplish the following: 
• identify PPS objectives 
• establish facility design 
• design the PPS 
• analyze the PPS design (using an integrated systems analysis approach) 
Depending on the assessment method used, a risk assessment may be conducted: 
• against an existing facility 
• against a facility master plan that has been designed but not constructed 
• in parallel during the design process 
Where possible, it is always best to determine the PPS objectives and incorporate these objec-
tives into the PPS design during the facility master design process.  This is the most cost-
effective and efficient method of conducting risk assessments because it mitigates the need for 
costly redesign and facility upgrades necessary to protect against a design basis threat (DBT).  It 
also provides an opportunity to engineer a PPS design against current and future postulated 
threats.  In addition, it provides opportunities to reduce the cost of the PPS over the life of a fa-
cility by reducing reliance on operational programs.  For example, if a site could reduce by 10 
the number of security force personnel required to meet the high assurance objective by imple-
menting engineered security features, this would result in a cost reduction of (10 people/shift) * 
(3 shifts/people) * ($175K/year)*(40 years) = $210M minus the cost of the design, implementa-
tion, and maintenance of the engineered security features utilized. 
For nuclear power reactors in the design stage it is strongly recommended to perform an iterative 
design and evaluation process as described in the Nuclear Power Plant Security Assessment 
Format and Content Guide [Ref. 1] considering the best practices identified in this chapter and 
the security system technologies in Chapter 5.  It is also recommended to use this document as a 
technical manual.  The result of this iterative design process could yield a more effective, inte-
grated, and cost effective site security strategy.  Designs that have not yet completed their vital 
area designs have the best opportunity to benefit from the performance of such a security as-
sessment. 
4.2 Target Identification 
Target identification provides the foundation for designing an effective PPS because it deter-
mines what to protect, while the PPS design determines how to protect.  Target identification 
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should not take into account the threat27 or the difficulty of providing physical protection.  In 
general, target identification should know what the undesirable consequences are, use a robust 
method to identify the targets, and then identify the targets (or target areas).  Targets may include 
areas within the site, specific equipment, nuclear materials, infrastructure, processes, or other 
assets that if subjected to a particular threat could have undesirable or unacceptable conse-
quences.  For any new commercial nuclear power plant, the set of targets that determine what to 
protect should be such that if protected, undesired consequences cannot happen (or at least can-
not happen because of the malevolent intent of the adversaries).28 
4.3 Threat Definition 
A threat analysis must be completed to determine the threats to a facility.  These threats must be 
determined before an effective PPS can be designed and the PPS must be designed to protect 
against the defined threat.  A threat analysis should result in a formal, detailed description of the 
threat by a malevolent adversary.  The threat definition must describe the physical capabilities, 
motivations, and potential actions of the adversary.  This description should also include both 
outsider and insider adversary types and capabilities, as well as the potential threat of outsiders 
working in collusion with insiders.  It is necessary for the regulatory agency to ensure that an 
adequate threat analysis has been completed and that the subsequent DBT is provided to the PPS 
designers so that they can design an effective PPS.29 
4.4 Planning and Design 
Effective PPS design begins with the planning process.  While this is an obvious first step, it is 
critical to include all necessary stakeholders in the master planning process to achieve a design 
that meets the requirements of operations, safety, and security.  This approach to master planning 
provides an integrated strategy for engineered design, construction, and maintenance of nuclear 
power plant facilities that in the long-term is cost-effective and more efficient and helps to re-
duce short-term decision-making that tends to occur at the project level.  Limiting or excluding 
security representation during the design process will ultimately have a negative impact on PPS 
effectiveness and invite unnecessary future costs through retrofitting to mitigate an ever-
changing threat spectrum.  Addressing security concerns that are based on threat-specific as-
sessments of nuclear power plants with engineered PPS design solutions throughout the master 
planning and design process will ensure adequate and efficient protection of personnel, equip-
ment, property, and infrastructure. 
Incorporating effective PPS engineered design elements into the master plan requires subject 
matter experts representing the detection, delay, and response disciplines.  It is also essential to 
include expert vulnerability analysts who are qualified to assess the identified threats against the 
                                                 
27What to protect is determined by the consequences that are to be avoided (e.g., a radioactive release beyond a 
specified quantity); thus, the threat plays no role in determining the targets.  However, the threat will play a role in 
determining the degree of sophistication of the PPS. 
28Targets not susceptible to a given threat (i.e., the given threat does not have the knowledge, skills, tool set, and 
motivation necessary to attack the targets) are not a target for any scenario that involves that threat. 
29The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is responsible for identifying the DBT and providing it to the organizations 
responsible for designing new commercial reactor facilities so that the designers can develop an appropriate PPS for 
the facility. 
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identified targets, the performance of a PPS design against the identified threats, and are quali-
fied to determine protection system effectiveness and the associated overall risk. 
Best Practices for Planning and Design: 
• Establish a security team to provide PPS design requirements. 
• Define security team roles, responsibilities, and authority as it integrates with the facility 
design team. 
• Determine the resources necessary to support security design and analysis. 
• Identify and document security design requirements early in the facility design process. 
• Security design requirements should be based on a threat-specific assessment of nuclear 
power plants. 
• Plan for an iterative process of design, analysis, and redesign and reanalysis. 
4.5 Site Selection and Layout Design 
4.5.1 Site Selection 
Site selection for nuclear power plants will be controlled by competing priorities, demands, and 
considerations that will significantly influence where the facilities are constructed.  These fac-
tors, such as operational needs, political constraints, environmental concerns, property availabil-
ity, cost, and local, state, and federal regulations will present challenges that the planners will 
have to adequately address during site selection.  Therefore it is essential that security concerns 
be identified and PPS requirements documented early in the site selection process.  By address-
ing security concerns with the proposed site, early in the process, it helps to ensure that the site 
location is compatible with an effective PPS design.  It is also more cost-effective and efficient 
to resolve concerns during the planning process than attempting to address them after site selec-
tion. 
4.5.2 Layout Design 
The layout design of a site will generally be driven by nuclear power plant operational and func-
tional requirements, safety concerns, and the particular site selected.  However, the layout design 
should also include elements of physical protection that include a layered approach to security 
(access controls, entry control points, access roads, delivery locations, parking lots, etc.), security 
area locations (owner controlled, vital,  and protected areas), entrances for external response and 
emergency services, and security force facilities.  As part of the site layout design a terrain 
analysis should be conducted to define terrain characteristics relative to both security and adver-
sary forces.  Terrain characteristics should be evaluated to determine: 
• Natural and manmade features that may provide vantage points or obstacles. 
• Observation points, fields of fire, clear zones, and cover and concealment areas. 
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• Likely avenues of adversary approach and required security response approaches. 
• The traversal time on foot and by vehicle for adversaries and security response. 
• Low-lying areas that facilitate use of chemical weapons and obscurants. 
• Perimeter requirements for standoff distance, barriers, entry/exit control points, perimeter 
lighting, etc. 
Best Practices for Site Selection and Layout Design: 
• Identify and document any security concerns associated with the site under review for se-
lection and the prospective site layout design. 
• Ensure to the extent possible that the site location and layout are compatible with an ef-
fective PPS design. 
• Interior design should consider choke points en route to vital areas/equipment. 
• Conduct a terrain analysis as part of the site selection and layout design to define terrain 
characteristics that may be of tactical importance to the security or adversary force. 
• Aircraft approaches should be analyzed with regard to their feasibility of being used to 
strike areas of concern. 
4.6 Designing the Physical Protection System 
The purpose of a PPS is to prevent an adversary from completing a malevolent act that subse-
quently results in unacceptable consequences.  The primary functions of a PPS are detection, de-
lay, and response.  These functions must be balanced and work effectively together to form an 
effective protection system.  For the system to be effective, the adversary must be detected and 
sufficiently delayed along his attack path until security forces can respond and neutralize the ad-
versary.  The following sections discuss detection, delay, and response.  In addition, sections on 
insider mitigation, additional PPS considerations, and planning for future threat and adversary 
capability changes are included. 
4.6.1 Detection 
Detection is the discovery of an adversary action and includes sensing of covert or overt actions.  
Detection may be performed by a person, such as security force personnel who are assigned to 
fixed posts or on patrol.  However, while security force personnel perform a vital role in the 
overall protection system and may detect an intrusion, this method of detection is not always the 
most reliable.  Consequently, the probability of detection assigned to this method is generally 
low.  The most effective detection systems are electronic systems and include: 
• exterior intrusion sensors 
• interior intrusion sensors 
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• video alarm assessment 
• alarm communication and display (AC&D) systems 
• entry control systems 
For detection to occur: 
1. A sensor reacts to a stimulus and initiates an alarm 
2. The information from the sensor and assessment subsystems is reported and displayed 
3. A person assesses this information and judges the alarm to be valid or invalid 
A critical element of detection is the process of assessment, which is determining whether an 
alarm is valid or invalid and what specific threat, if any, is present.  Without this important de-
termination, the cause of the alarm is unknown and the appropriate response may not be pro-
vided; thus detection without assessment is not detection.  As a result, protection system effec-
tiveness may be seriously degraded. 
The engineered design and layout of detection systems is a complicated and rigorous process that 
requires subject matter experts in electrical power systems, fiber optic systems, communications, 
sensors, video assessment, AC&D systems, delay, and response.  In general, however, an effec-
tive detection system provides defense-in-depth with site, facility, and target detection systems. 
Best Practices for Detection: 
• A properly designed detection system incorporates detection at the perimeter through the 
use of a Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System, video assessment system 
capabilities along probable adversary attack paths, and facility and target detection and 
assessment equipment.  In addition, use of extended detection capabilities (i.e., detection 
that senses outward into the owner controlled area from the protected area perimeter) 
should be considered. 
• An effective external (i.e., perimeter) detection system will include a properly installed 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) designed with multiple complimentary sensors, over-
lapping detection zones, electronic assessment equipment, and reporting capability.   
• Measures of effectiveness for detection functions should be the probability of sensing an 
adversary action and the time required for reporting and assessing the alarm.   
• A good detection system is designed using components that have validated performance 
measures established for operation and the false and nuisance alarm rates are as low as 
possible for local environmental conditions.  In addition, a good detection system has 
administrative measures implemented to keep nuisance alarms acceptably low (e.g., good 
housekeeping activities that keep weeds and bushes trimmed near fence lines and animal 
barriers thus minimizing the potential for interaction with sensors). 
• An effective detection system includes an effective assessment system that provides in-
formation about the type of alarm received (adversary attack, false, or nuisance alarm). 
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• Security lighting is an integrated element of the IDS and is essential to enable security 
forces to maintain continuity of operations during low-light and nighttime hours.  A 
properly designed and installed perimeter security lighting system assists detection and 
assessment and increases the effectiveness of electronic security systems by sufficiently 
illuminating the perimeter during low-light conditions and darkness to ensure a high 
probability of detection, sensing, and assessment. 
• A robust detection system includes effective entry and exit controls that not only maxi-
mize authorized personnel and vehicle traffic flow but also does so safely and securely.  
Entry and exit control functions are conducted at access control points (ACPs) and are in-
tended to control the access (entry and exit) of personnel, visitors, and vehicles. 
– ACP functions should include access control, personnel and vehicle searches, and 
emergency response entry (fire, medical, etc.). 
– The ACP should also provide hardened, secure locations for security forces to defend 
themselves and their battle space. 
– The priority of an entry and exit control system is to maintain perimeter security. 
• Detection system support infrastructure (electrical power, communications, fiber optics, 
cabling, etc.) should be separate, protected, and dedicated to security systems. 
• Unattended openings30 that intersect a security boundary should be identified.31  Where 
possible, electronic detection of unauthorized entry (or exit) should be installed.  If elec-
tronic detection is neither possible nor practical, then delay barriers should be installed 
and observation by security personnel should occur with a frequency that allows timely 
response upon detecting evidence of ingress, egress, or tampering. 
4.6.2 Delay 
Delay is a major function of a PPS.  The PPS should be designed to impede adversary penetra-
tion into or exit from a security area or target location and at the target set itself.  Delay can be 
accomplished by passive delay systems such as physical barriers, activated systems such as acti-
vated dispensable materials, activated lethal or non-lethal systems, or by the response of security 
forces.  The delay time to penetrate a delay element depends on the type32 of attack, location of 
                                                 
30To deny unauthorized personnel access, openings greater than or equal to 96 in.2 and larger than 6 in. in the small-
est dimension should be identified.  If theft is a concern or if the passing of items that may be used to aid in sabotage 
or theft must be considered, then the size of the openings is determined by the minimum size of the object or mate-
rial that will be passed.  For additional information see Regulatory Information Summary 2005-04, “Guidance on 
the Protection of Unattended Openings that Intersect a Security Boundary or Area,” dated April 14, 2005. 
31During the design of a site and its associated buildings and facilities, a concerted effort should be made to identify 
any unattended openings meeting the specified requirements.  Identifying the openings during the design process 
should allow for a more orderly inclusion of the openings when designing (and subsequently installing) the detection 
sensors, thereby saving money in the long run.  
32One type of attack could be by unskilled adversaries who do not have the knowledge or skills to defeat delay ele-
ments; thus it could take them a long time to defeat the delay elements.  Another type of attack could be by skilled 
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the attack, the tools and equipment used, and the skill set of the adversary.  The task time to 
breach a delay element is considered delay only if it occurs after detection and assessment of an 
adversary action.   
Effective delay has become increasingly important in the design of a PPS to counter the increase 
in adversary capabilities.  The application of robust delay systems not only includes improved 
fixed barrier designs, but also includes activated dispensable materials and activated lethal and 
non-lethal systems.  These enhanced delay systems are important because they allow trade-offs 
with the numbers of on-site security forces, providing a cost-effective alternative to increasing 
the numbers of additional security force personnel to meet new threats and adversary capabili-
ties. 
Physical barriers are a vital element of the overall security system, serving a dual purpose.  Prop-
erly designed and installed barriers are used to control the authorized entry and exit of personnel 
and vehicles by channeling the flow of personnel and vehicles through designated control points 
where access authorization can be verified and inspections and searches conducted.  An equally 
important purpose for barriers is to physically impede unauthorized entry and exit. 
Physical barriers are obstructions designed or deployed to impede, disrupt, turn, or block the 
movement of an adversary force.  The obstacles can be natural, manmade, or a combination of 
both.  Obstacles can be used to delay or redirect the advance of personnel, equipment, and vehi-
cles of the adversary force.  A barrier is a coordinated series of obstacles than can channel, di-
rect, redirect, delay, and/or stop the movement of an adversary force.  Barriers are most effective 
when they can be used to redirect the approach of adversary forces.  They are also employed to 
prevent adversary vehicles from entering an installation or the area around a critical facility.  
Barriers may be passive (fences, walls, vehicle barriers, etc.) or active (pop-up vehicle barriers, 
etc.).  Barriers may also be provided by natural elements of the terrain, such as mountains, rivers, 
thick forests, ravines, etc. 
Best Practices for Delay: 
• The design of facility delay elements should be balanced to provide equivalent33 delay 
times.  This also applies to the site delay elements. 
• Unattended openings should be protected by delay features that provide delay times that 
are equivalent to the boundary being penetrated.  
• Delay systems and elements should only be installed when complemented with detection 
and assessment systems.  Delay only occurs after detection with assessment and a secu-
rity response initiated. 
                                                                                                                                                             
adversaries who do know how and are skilled at defeating delay elements, thus taking only a short time to defeat the 
delay elements. 
33The use of equivalent is not meant to require that all delay times be the same.  Rather it is used to ensure that no 
one delay element has a delay time that is substantially less than the delay times for the other elements in the layer.  
This prevents one path through the layer from being much easier to penetrate.  Thus, for example, the doors that 
penetrate a massive concrete wall do not have to have the exact same delay as the wall, which may be several min-
utes; rather the delays for the doors that penetrate the wall should be comparable and this delay should be sufficient 
to ensure adequate response force time when all other protection system delays are considered. 
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• Multiple and different barriers or combinations of delay elements should be used to pro-
vide delay-in-depth and to extend penetration times by increasing adversary task com-
plexity, thereby  requiring the adversary to use different skills, better planning, and a va-
riety of tools to defeat the delay. 
• The use of active delay systems with passive delay elements are complementary and im-
prove the overall delay effectiveness. 
• Delay systems that are installed close to target sets are usually the most cost-effective; 
however, care must be taken to ensure that this delay cannot be used to make it difficult 
for the response force to perform its function. 
• Barriers, when possible, should be located, designed, and installed so that they do not 
provide a defensible fighting location for the adversary force. 
• Delay incorporates robust facility design features that include gabion wall construction, 
concrete and earth overburden, and massive delay doors with preferably equivalent delay 
to walls. 
• Delay incorporates advanced response and denial systems or the infrastructure capability 
to install these systems at a later date should the adversary threat and capabilities in-
crease.  Examples of advanced response and denial systems include: 
– Remotely Operated Weapon System 
– Munitions-Based Access Denial System 
– Dispensable materials (e.g., cold smoke, sticky foam) 
• Emergency egress is designed such that it does not defeat delay elements. 
• Effective delay systems: 
– Limit the number of paths an adversary can take to reach the targets being protected 
– Channel, choke, and expose the adversaries to security force assault34 
– Allow for the interruption and neutralization of the attack at all points along adver-
sary path 
– Impede the adversary by increasing his task time with robust delay along limited 
paths and at critical points 
• If extended detection capabilities (i.e., sensors that detect in the owner-controlled area) 
are used, then installation of vehicle and foot travel impediments should be considered 
(e.g., large rip rock that makes vehicle and foot travel difficult). 
                                                 
34Such systems could include robust delay systems at the protected area boundary that allow the response force to 
neutralize the adversary there. 
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4.6.3 Response 
Security forces provide the response function.  The appropriate design and construction of secu-
rity force response facilities is critical to ensure timely interruption and neutralization of an ad-
versary attack.  Security force facilities are an integral part of the overall nuclear power plant de-
sign.  The type, location, design, and construction of security force facilities should be well 
thought out with the design requirements based on comprehensive threat and risk assessments 
(i.e., the DBT).  Security force facility design should also include the capacity to include future 
physical security upgrades and new technology solutions in order to meet higher protection re-
quirements resulting from new threats and increased adversary capabilities.35 
Security force facilities, which are discussed in the following sections, include central alarm sta-
tions and secondary alarm stations, permanent posts, fighting positions, and training facilities.  
To be effective the response force must know where the adversary is so that appropriate tactics 
can be employed to defeat the adversary.  Situational awareness components such as cameras 
and motion or sound sensors can be employed to help the security force determine the locations 
of the adversaries.  These components may be in excess of those needed simply for detecting the 
adversary. 
4.6.3.1 Central and Secondary Alarm Stations 
A central alarm station (CAS) is essentially a security command center that controls security 
communications, interfaces with site operations, and is the central point where alarm and as-
sessment information is transported to the AC&D system.  A secondary alarm station (SAS) pro-
vides a backup system, with redundant capability, for the CAS. 
Best Practices for a CAS and SAS: 
• The CAS and SAS should be located within a protected area. 
• The CAS should be segregated from normal plant operations. 
• The CAS may be co-located close to identified target areas but segregated from normal 
plant operations. 
• The CAS and SAS should be hardened to protect against adversary weapons fire and ex-
plosives devices as determined by the DBT. 
• The CAS and SAS should be equipped with duress systems that annunciate to other secu-
rity posts. 
• The CAS and SAS should be equipped with alternate communication systems. 
                                                 
35This requires the designer to consider the need for allowing additional, and as yet unused, space and support (e.g., 
power and communications) in the design of the security force facility.  Simply stated, the design should allow space 
for future expansion. 
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• The design of the CAS and SAS should incorporate a positive and separate entry control 
system with two-person controls to ensure that both personnel and equipment are ade-
quately protected against both insider and outsider threats. 
• The CAS and SAS AC&D system should have backup power sources to ensure continu-
ity of operations for a minimum of four hours. 
4.6.3.2 Permanent Posts 
Permanent posts are designed as fixed positions at optimum locations where security forces con-
trol access to a protected area and those areas containing high-consequence targets.  These posts 
include entry/exit control points designed to allow authorized entry/exit of personnel and vehi-
cles.  Permanent posts should provide the capability to inspect and search personnel and vehicles, 
packages, and hand-carried items to deter and detect inbound prohibited and controlled articles 
and outbound unauthorized removal of other assets.  Permanent posts may also include towers, 
overwatch positions, response vehicle positions, and hardened fighting positions. 
Best Practices for Permanent Posts: 
• Posts should provide adequate human factors engineering to ensure that security person-
nel can perform their duties efficiently.  Posts should also provide protection from 
weather and temperature conditions, adequate lighting, and facilities to meet personal hy-
giene needs.  In addition, post design should consider work-related environmental haz-
ards (e.g., lead and carbon monoxide). 
• Post design should consider defense-in-depth and redeployment strategies inside the 
power block. 
• Posts must be located such that likely routes of adversary entry and exit or their attack 
paths can be clearly observed and countered by security force interruption and neutraliza-
tion tactics (i.e., cover and concealment opportunities for the adversary should be mini-
mized).  These posts may take the form of multilevel fighting positions that are built into 
the appropriate facility buildings.  These fighting positions should allow the response 
force personnel to engage the adversaries before they enter the site, before they enter spe-
cific buildings on the site, and within specified buildings.  Where possible, these posts 
should provide for overlapping fields of fire. 
• Posts must provide protected routes or avenues of tactical approach by responding secu-
rity force personnel.  For posts protecting the interior of buildings, entry should require 
passage through an established fighting position. 
• Entry/exit control posts must be designed to provide unobstructed views to facilitate ob-
servation of unauthorized attempts to bypass detection systems. 
• All posts should be hardened to provide security personnel adequate protection against 
weapons fire and explosives devices as determined by the DBT. 
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• All posts should be equipped with duress systems that annunciate at a minimum in the 
CAS and SAS.  Annunciation may include other overwatch posts but should not include 
the initiating post. 
• All posts should be equipped with readily available alternate communication systems 
(e.g., two-way radio fixed-base system, mobile radio systems, telephone, dedicated direct 
line telephones, intercom systems). 
4.6.3.3 Security Fighting Positions 
Security fighting positions are generally defensive in nature and are used to provide hardened, 
force protection positions from which to direct fire at attacking adversary forces.  Fighting posi-
tions can also be used as observation points, fire control points to direct fire from other positions, 
or offensive positions that the security forces respond to in an attempt to interrupt and neutralize 
adversary forces.  
Best Practices for Fighting Positions: 
• Fighting positions should be designed to take advantage of natural terrain features, site 
layout and facility design, and target and asset locations. 
• Fighting positions should be located such that adversary cover and concealment is mini-
mized (e.g., if a fighting position is located such that the effective field of fire is in a cor-
ridor, then the corridor should be kept clear of materials that may be used by the adver-
saries). 
• Fighting positions should provide directed fields of fire for the type of security force 
weapons used at each position. 
• Fighting positions should provide overlapping fields of fire with adjacent fighting posi-
tions. 
• Fighting positions should be hardened to protect against weapons identified in the DBT. 
• Fighting positions placed at the protected area boundary should be designed to allow for 
surveillance into the owner-controlled area in day/night conditions and should have com-
ponents to allow for alarm assessment.  
4.6.3.4 Training Facilities 
Training facilities support security forces and enable these forces to maintain the knowledge, 
skills, and motivation to effectively perform response functions critical to the protection of high-
consequence assets.  This includes facilities for weapons and physical fitness training, qualifica-
tions, and maintenance; special skills and site-specific training and qualifications; and simulated 
site target locations for force-on-force training. 
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Best Practices for Training Facilities: 
• Training facilities must be capable of supporting realistic and intense security force train-
ing and qualification programs required to effectively engage and defeat a well-armed, 
trained, and motivated adversary. 
• Physical fitness facilities should contain diverse types of equipment to support both mus-
culature and cardiovascular development and maintenance. 
• Training facilities should be located on site, or near the site, to maximize training process 
efficiency and minimize lifecycle training costs. 
4.6.4 Insider Mitigation 
Insider adversaries have the benefit of having authorized access past standard access controls 
designed to detect and adversary intrusion.  Risk of active or active violent insider actions may 
be mitigated by an insider mitigation program.  An insider mitigation program consists of two 
parts, elements that mitigate the intent of a potential insider and elements that mitigate the capa-
bility of a potential insider.  Personnel related programs such as Access Authorization, Behav-
ioral Observation and Fitness-for-Duty address an individual’s intent to commit sabotage.  The 
physical protection part or component of a program consists of search devices at personnel ac-
cess portals, surveillances by security force personnel to identify tampering and specific meas-
ures to detect insider actions attempting sabotage at target locations.  The remainder of the dis-
cussion in this section describes how to develop those measures to identify and develop design 
elements to detect insider sabotage actions at target areas. 
Best Practices for Insider Mitigation: 
• Physical protection measures that detect insider acts of sabotage include both physical 
and administrative controls.  An analysis should be performed, specifically focused on 
active insider acts of sabotage to develop the measures.  The first step involves identify-
ing those components or areas that could be potentially vulnerable to acts of insider sabo-
tage and are targets within a target set.  
• For example, at a nuclear power plant, a specific type of valve may serve to provide a 
specific safety function that is relied upon to maintain core cooling and therefore the 
valve and the mechanisms to control it would be potential sabotage targets.  Measures to 
protect this function could include placing the mechanisms that could control the valve 
(outside of the control room) in a penetration resistant cabinet that is tamper alarmed and 
locked.  These physical measures could be incorporated into the design of the facility.  
The design scope would include the physical location of the cabinet, the construction ma-
terials of the cabinet, the type of lock, and the conduit pathways that would supply power, 
and signal information for the valve and the tamper switch.  Additional administrative 
controls for this example could include implementing a two person (i.e., both are knowl-
edgeable persons) rule when such a cabinet is to be accessed, developing key control 
measures for the lock to the cabinet and developing security force measures that outline 
the response to cabinet tamper alarm received in an alarm station. 
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4.6.5 Additional Physical Protection System Considerations 
In addition to the best practices identified in the previous subsections, the following best prac-
tices are offered: 
• Loading and unloading of trucks transporting fuel (i.e., mixed oxide) should be per-
formed in buildings that completely enclose the truck and the loading/unloading activi-
ties. 
• Sally-port designs for package, personnel, and vehicles should ensure that: 
– Only one portal (i.e., entry or exit) can be open at a time (i.e., one portal is always 
closed) 
– Security force personnel can direct fire into these areas from fighting positions 
– Over-watch positions for these areas should have emergency lock-down capabilities 
• Personnel access and material portals that can be located underground may be used to 
deny access to the facility through these portals if adversary actions are detected.  
4.6.6 Planning for Future Threat and Adversary Capability Changes 
Given the current threat environment, a seemingly ever-increasing threat potential, it would be 
prudent to plan for increases in threat and adversary capability.  To this end, nuclear power plant 
facility designers should consider “designing in” potential upgrade capabilities into a facility de-
sign that is to be submitted in a design certification or combined license application to the U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission for approval.  Examples to consider include: 
• excess conduit and conduit channel capacity to allow addition of communications, con-
trol, and power cables for additional and/or new detection, delay, and response protection 
elements 
• locations where additional hardened fighting positions can be installed to address in-
creased numbers of adversaries or capabilities 
• locations where additional active denial systems can be installed to increase delay and/or 
increase the potential for neutralization 
In addition, the designers should perform sensitivity studies on the proposed PPS design, using 
the integrated analysis techniques and tools described in Chapters 2 and 3 and increases or 
changes in the DBT (both numbers and capabilities), to identify the PPS breaking point (i.e., the 
point at which the PPS no longer provides adequate protection) and to identify potential PPS 
modifications that if implemented would allow the PPS to prevent the undesired consequences.  
Once these modifications are identified, the current facility and PPS design should be examined 
to identify how difficult it would be to implement these modifications.  If the modifications can 
be made with minimal future cost, no additional work need be performed.  However, if substan-
tial future cost would be necessary, then the designers should reexamine the proposed PPS to de-
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termine whether modifications could be made that would not impact current PPS effectiveness 
but would facilitate the implementation of the future upgrades.  
4.7 Best Practices:  Evaluate the Physical Protection System Design 
4.7.1 Pathway Analysis 
For a pathway analysis to be effective, the person performing the analysis must be intimately fa-
miliar with the ongoing or proposed plant/facility design.  They must be aware of all credible 
ways in or out of each location, building, and room.  They must be able to think like the adver-
sary and understand how the adversary could: 
• use the terrain or local environment to evade detection 
• defeat or bypass protection elements using standard or imaginative techniques (i.e., how 
can they go over, through, around, or under the protection element) 
• use deceit or stealth to gain entrance into the facility 
4.7.2 Neutralization Analysis 
The performance of an effective neutralization analysis requires the use of subject matter experts 
who are familiar with adversary tactics and those familiar with all aspects of the protection force 
(e.g., travel time to assigned post once alarm has been sounded, security force deployment tac-
tics, use of deadly force, and weapons deployment).  The analysis should consider the variation 
in possible environmental conditions (e.g., day or night, season of the year, clear or foggy) and 
how such conditions affect the ability of the protective force to respond to an attack.  In addition, 
the analysts must be familiar with the tools that will be used, especially their weaknesses, to es-
timate the probability of neutralization. 
4.7.3 Risk Analysis 
An effective risk analysis combines the information from the other parts of the design and analy-
sis tasks to determine the risk associated with a particular design.36  In addition, the analyst 
should be able to identify system weaknesses and understand why those weaknesses occur. 
                                                 
36Remember, the typical analysis currently being performed is a conditional risk analysis where an attack is assumed 
to occur and the objective of the analysis is to determine the effectiveness of the PPS in preventing the undesired 
consequences.  Thus the focus is on determining PE (i.e., probability of system effectiveness). 
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5. SECURITY SYSTEM TECHNOLOGIES 
5.1 Introduction 
As part of the revision to NUREG/CR-1345, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) was tasked to 
provide information on a select set of security technologies.  While the following sections pro-
vide information on the set jointly identified by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
project manager and the SNL staff, the following caution is provided: 
Security technology is a rich and diverse research and development arena.  
Solutions to the new challenges facing post-9/11 America are works in progress.  
Some promising new products have been developed recently and are discussed 
briefly in the following sections, but the reader should note that any discussion of 
new technology is a snapshot in time.  Upgrades, updates, and new directions are 
inevitable.  Security system designers are encouraged to seek advances in security 
technology that have occurred since this list was compiled in late 2006. 
Each technology profiled includes what it does as far as detection, delay, or response and infor-
mation on what it takes to implement (e.g., cost, footprint, electrical requirements).  SNL per-
sonnel and others are listed as primary contacts for additional information.  In addition, NRC 
physical security staff may be able to aid in providing more information as well. 
5.2 Trace and Bulk Explosives Detection Systems 
5.2.1 Introduction 
Detecting contraband carried by personnel upon entrance to a facility can be difficult and time-
consuming.  While a physical search by security officers can be thorough, the process is labor-
intensive and slows the throughput for personnel traveling to work. 
Using technology to detect explosives can solve many of these problems.  Two main technolo-
gies, trace and bulk explosives detection systems (EDSs), provide solutions for various detection 
applications, including the detection of explosives carried by personnel or concealed in packages 
and vehicles.  The purchase of an EDS depends on the application for which it is intended.  As 
with all detection systems, the response to an alarm must be determined by the site using the 
EDSs.  The response to an alarm should consist of a decision tree of actions that may include, but 
are not limited to, a second sampling for detection, interview of the person associated with detec-
tion, isolation of a potential explosive, canine team detection, and expulsion from the site.  The 
user should be cautioned that the best system for explosive detection relies on several diverse 
methods, such as x-ray, manual search, canine, and trace detection. 
5.2.2 Trace Explosives Detection Systems 
Trace EDSs can detect explosives residue on personnel, packages, and vehicles from the vapor or 
particles exuded from bulk explosives that are present or residue left by the handling of explo-
sives.  Many of the trace detection sensors, designed to analyze chemicals, can be adjusted to test 
for illegal drugs rather than of explosives. 
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For personnel screening applications (Figure 5-1), the dimensions of a personnel portal footprint 
is approximately 75 in. long by 50 in. wide and 90 in. tall, weighing approximately 1800 lb.  
Power requirements include access to 208/220 VAC, 50 Hz or 60 Hz, with a 40-amp maximum.  
Costs for commercial explosives detection personnel portals range from $100K to $150K.   
Handheld EDSs (Figure 5-2) can provide mobility that a portal cannot and thus can provide for 
the inspection of packages and items carried by personnel or shipped to the facility.  Commercial 
handheld EDSs can range from 6 to 12 lb, and the available technology includes ion mobility 
spectrometry, chemiluminescence, gas chromatography, mass spectrometry, surface acoustic 
wave, and thermo-redox.  Equipment size is approximately the size of a small carry-on bag.  
Prices range from $20K to $60K, depending on the equipment and its capabilities.  Another class 
of similar equipment includes benchtop or semi-portable detectors that weigh considerably more, 
from 50 to 165 lb, and range in cost from $25K to $60K.  These detectors are suitable for place-
ment at a checkpoint and can be used for checking vehicles or packages via swipe sampling.  
Vehicle portals using trace technology are under development as well (Figure 5-3).  The foot-
print is roughly 18 ft by 8 ft by 7 ft and the cost is approximately $200K.  The trace portals work 
by removing a vapor sample from the interior or exterior of the vehicle and detecting trace resi-
dues of explosives. 
 
 
Figure 5-1. Trace explosives detection personnel portal undergoing a test 
at a Department of Energy facility. 
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Figure 5-2.  An example of a handheld trace explosives detection system. 
 
 
Figure 5-3.  An example of a mobile trace explosives detection vehicle portal. 
 
5.2.3 Bulk Explosives Detection Systems 
Bulk EDSs use a radiation source to interrogate the person, item, or vehicle in question and de-
tect and analyze the response from all materials present.  In bulk detection, a visible mass of ex-
plosives material is detected, either by imaging techniques or through technology that probes nu-
clear (i.e., elemental and molecular) properties of the material.  Bulk explosive techniques meas-
ure and analyze the characteristics of the materials in question in an attempt to detect the possible 
presence of explosives. 
While some personnel screening applications have been developed and approved for use (e.g., 
low-dose backscatter x-ray), the public perception of being subjected to any type of radiation 
(and the resulting privacy issues associated with imaging beneath clothing) makes the implemen-
tation of such types of EDSs problematic.  Companies have developed algorithms that conceal 
the human image while identifying anomalous areas that may indicate concealed weapons or ex-
plosives.  The footprint for such units is large and may require up to 15 ft by 6 ft (Figure 5-4).  
The purchase cost can be in the $100K range. 
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Figure 5-4. Example of a low-dose backscatter x-ray person-
nel screening system (Photo courtesy of AS&E). 
Inspection of items such as packages or bags can be performed with x-ray- or gamma-ray-based 
EDSs, computed tomography, or some form of nuclear interrogation.  This type of technology is 
mature and is often seen in airports, where travelers place their bags on a conveyor belt.  The 
item is interrogated with ionizing radiation and an operator inspects the image for contraband.  
This form of detection can be subject to human error and operator fatigue.  To combat these is-
sues, commercial vendors are developing software that automatically flag suspect areas for op-
erator inspection.  Some computed tomography systems automatically detect molecular weight 
and quantity of target compounds and generate an alarm, but these devices may cost from $500K 
to $1000K and require an area 15 ft by 6 ft for installation. 
Vehicle screening for bulk explosives can be accomplished in portals that can accommodate 
large (semi-truck-sized) vehicles and can typically cost from $250K to $500K.  However, per-
sonnel must exit the vehicle before scanning.  One such portal has motorized dual scan heads 
that move on tracks along each side of the vehicle being inspected, and each scan head has an 
electronic neutron generator that interrogates the vehicle from the exterior to image the interior.  
An array of detectors captures the integrating neutrons enabling an image to be formed that may 
highlight areas of possible explosives. 
For additional information contact: 
William Rhodes III, Manager 
Contraband Detection Dept. 
Dept. 6418 
(505) 844-4597 
wgrhode@sandia.gov 
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For information about how to purchase EDSs and a complete list of available technology, consult 
the National Institute of Justice’s website for the Survey of Commercially Available Explosives 
Detection Technologies and Equipment 2004, at the following location: http://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/grants/208861.pdf. 
5.3 Vehicle Barriers 
The U.S. Department of State publishes a list of commercially available vehicle barriers that 
have been certified by test as acceptable for use against threat vehicles of 15,000 lb up to speeds 
of 50 MPH.  In the post-9/11 era, the U.S. government has experienced an escalation of the 
threat level to many of its high-security national assets.  With the escalating threat level, these 
barriers are either unproven or inadequate.  As a result of this increase in threat, performance 
validation testing of vehicle barriers typically used to protect these national assets or facilities 
has been conducted to determine whether the vehicle barriers provide sufficient delay or denial 
against the current threat. 
This testing program was conducted for a consortium of federal agencies including the Depart-
ment of Energy (DOE), the Department of Defense (DoD), the State Department, and others.  
Commercially available vehicle barrier products as well as new collaborative designs were 
tested, including fixed bollards, fixed vehicle barriers, and hydraulically activated vehicle barri-
ers. 
Some of the vehicle barriers in use today at many federal facilities were designed and installed 
prior to the escalation of the threat level.  This testing program provides test data of the barrier 
performance against a threat several times the design basis of these barriers. 
New innovative solutions to prevent vehicle penetrations have been tested for the DoD (Figure 
5-5).  These barrier designs take advantage of locally available materials to assist in stopping the 
threat vehicles where large perimeters must be protected.  This use of available materials is 
shown in Figure 5-6. 
  
Figure 5-5. Testing new shallow mount 
vehicle barrier design 
Figure 5-6. Concrete and sand vehicle  
barrier 
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Each site or facility to be protected against vehicle threats presents many different design chal-
lenges.37  The shallow mount design pictured in Figure 5-5 was developed by the Texas Trans-
portation Institute and SNL for urban use. There is no typical solution; cost estimates and space 
requirements are developed on a site-by-site basis.  The Delta DSC501 wedge-type hydraulic 
vehicle barrier (Figure 5-7) costs about $65K installed and requires electricity to power the bar-
rier.  The RSA vehicle barrier (Figure 5-8) costs about $1200 per linear foot.  Vehicle barrier 
costs range upward from about $230 per linear foot, depending upon the size and design of the 
vehicle barrier that provides the required delay. 
  
Figure 5-7. Delta DSC501 hydraulic vehicle 
barrier. 
Figure 5-8.  RSA vehicle barrier. 
For additional information contact: 
Steven H. Scott, Manager 
Active Response and Denial Dept. 
Dept. 6422 
(505) 845-8149 
shscott@sandia.gov 
Mark McAllaster 
Vehicle Barrier Testing Lead 
Dept. 6422 
(505) 845-8349 
memcall@sandia.gov 
5.4 Remotely Operated Weapon Systems 
Recent events have dramatically increased the need for more effective security of high-value as-
sets.  Unfortunately, increasing security system effectiveness through traditional means (e.g., 
more response personnel) is challenged by the need to reduce the cost of security.  One possible 
                                                 
37As a design note, vehicle velocity may be lessened to meet vehicle barrier kinetic energy capabilities (e.g., use of 
serpentine approach path), and terrain features may be used to deny access of a vehicle threat.  See NUREG/CR-
4250, -6190, and other guidance documents on this topic available from the NRC. 
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solution to the “do more with less” goal is the use of Remotely Operated Weapon Systems 
(ROWS) (Figure 5-9).  ROWS have the potential to offer significant force multiplication and in-
crease response efficiency through improvements in delay and response. 
There are numerous advantages to using ROWS as a supplement to a security response force.  
The primary benefits are instantaneous response, ability of a single operator to respond to threats 
in different locations, increased target accuracy, immunity from hostile fire, and increased tacti-
cal efficiency.  Unlike a human, the ROWS does not get fatigued, and its accuracy is not affected 
by tremor, trigger anticipation, gun recoil, or shooter fatigue.  Its accuracies approach and some-
times exceed those of the best human snipers.  Because ROWS is controlled remotely by some-
one who is not in the line of fire (Figure 5-10), better decisions can be made about when to 
shoot.  Other advantages include the ability to respond to multiple threats and locations from one 
command center; immunity of the system to biological, radiological, chemical, and other envi-
ronments; and increased firepower with reduced costs. 
  
Figure 5-9.  Remotely Operated Weapon 
Systems platform. 
Figure 5-10. Remotely Operated Weapon 
Systems console. 
 
During evaluations, developmental ROWS systems were installed at SNL locations.  Trained op-
erators practiced using them against a variety of threats and scenarios.  SNL also modeled the 
use of ROWS on the Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation system (a computer modeling and 
simulation program that can estimate the delay imposed on an adversary through an added secu-
rity feature).  In many of the simulations, ROWS improved the accuracy of the operators and 
provided additional delay, giving human responders a better probability at stopping or repelling 
their adversaries.  
A ROWS is operated from a remote, secure location and consists of a weapon that is mounted on 
a robotic platform that can aim and fire the weapon.  An operator controls the robot, and thus the 
weapon, from a remote location by using a joystick and is able to view potential targets on a 
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video screen that displays exactly where the weapon is aimed.  For safety, two people are re-
quired for operation of a ROWS.  Numerous safety features have been incorporated into the sys-
tem to make accidental discharges nearly impossible. 
These platforms have the advantages of exceptional targeting accuracy, using a suite of optical 
and infrared cameras for surveillance and targeting.  With the addition of video motion detection, 
these cameras also could be used with as an area intrusion sensor.  The Generation 2 T-250FS 
model can accommodate the M16, M240, M249, and .50-caliber sniper weapons. 
The tactical platforms have proven to be robust and easily handled.  With the .50 caliber weapon 
option, the platform could potentially protect assets out to 1000 m or more.  They could be used 
to provide protection for critical infrastructure, pipelines, bridges, and other areas where the po-
tential for ambush or sabotage is high. 
The hardware costs for the platform are in the range of $250K per unit.  The first-time installa-
tion cost, which includes infrastructure, safety analysis and reviews, training, maintenance pro-
gram, and the like, is about $1M per platform.  The platform requires mounting, tower construc-
tion (for exterior applications), power, and fiber optic signal lines.  A command and control con-
sole is also required.  
For additional information contact: 
Steven H. Scott, Manager 
Active Response and Denial Dept. 
Dept. 6422 
(505) 845-8149 
shscott@sandia.gov 
5.5 Advanced Concept Armored Vehicle II 
The Advanced Concept Armored Vehicle II (ACAV II) project, funded by the Department of 
Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, studied requirements for mobile 
armored platforms, developed specifications, and researched methods to incorporate commer-
cially available technologies to produce an advanced armored vehicle that met the needs of asset 
protection (Figure 5-11).  The ACAV II took advantage of new armor developments and other 
technologies to field a vehicle similar in cost to currently used armored vehicles.  The ACAV II 
is a Class VI vehicle with thermal and closed circuit television (CCTV) viewing for the driver 
and a platform equipped with a thermal scope, standard scope, and CCTV for the gunner.  As of 
2006 the ACAV II can mount M-16s, SR-25s, M-249s, and M-240s.  The gunner is not exposed 
and the weapon utilization is remote.  The weapon is housed in a metal enclosure in the bed of 
the vehicle (Figure 5-11).  The controls can raise and lower the weapon and provide continuous 
360-degree travel horizontally and 60 degrees of elevation. 
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Figure 5-11. Advanced Concept Armored Vehicle II production 
armored response vehicle. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-12. Advanced Concept Armored Vehicle II proto-
type with weapon aiming and surveillance plat-
form. 
 
The ACAV II uses a long bed, one-ton pickup.  Two ACAV II variants have been developed: 
• 2004 General Motors Corporation :-ton 2500 Sierra pickup truck (converted to 1 ton).  
The vehicle’s engine and transmission are an extremely efficient and reliable combina-
tion that provides for sufficient power from a standstill position, noticeably more than 
that provided by the Ford F-350’s engine and transmission combination. 
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• 2005 Ford F-350 (1-ton) Super-Duty 4x4 pickup truck (production variant).  This vehicle 
design facilitates adding a door hinge to each door, which can be expected to signifi-
cantly increase the operational life expectancy of the armored doors. 
Each of these weighs approximately 10,000 lb when fully equipped.  The ACAV II is self-
sufficient and requires no external power.  In addition to providing a stronger response, the 
ACAV II is equipped with surveillance cameras, which can be used on patrol to augment detec-
tion capabilities.  Delay is also added by the stronger response. 
The cost to outfit the base vehicle is approximately $160K, which is comparable in cost to the 
armored vehicles now in use.  Adding weapons brings the total cost per unit to approximately 
$300K. 
For additional information contact: 
Jack Jones 
Transportation Assessment Department 
Dept. 6454 
(505) 845-9867 
jacjone@sandia.gov 
Skip Metcalf 
Transportation Assessment Department 
Dept. 6454 
(505) 844-7879 
hemetca@sandia.gov 
 
5.6 Virtual Presence and Extended Defense 
 
A Virtual Presence and Extended Defense (VPED) system extends detection, assessment, and 
possibly delay beyond traditional perimeters, so response forces have earlier warning of adver-
sary attacks or surveillance.  It places sensors and assessment beyond a site (i.e., protected area) 
perimeter to detect adversaries farther out (i.e., in the owner controlled area).  The advanced 
warning provides response forces more time to respond to the threat.  The VPED system is de-
signed to detect personnel and small vehicles along specific avenues of approach or assembly 
areas (e.g., a ditch or draw that allows adversaries to approach an owner-controlled area with lit-
tle likelihood of being seen by a roving patrol or a position that could be used by an adversary as 
a sniper position) and is not intended to be used to create a fully sensored extended perimeter 
(see Figure 5-13). 
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Figure 5-13. Notational diagram of site with potential adversary access route and sniper 
position instrumented with Virtual Presence and Extended Detection sys-
tem sensor nodes. 
 
A VPED system is not designed to replace a traditional Perimeter Intrusion Detection and As-
sessment System (PIDAS), but rather to augment an existing PIDAS to give better security sys-
tem effectiveness for land-based assault scenarios (i.e., foot and/or vehicle assaults).38  The 
VPED system consists of low powered sensors, and optimal performance of a VPED system is 
achieved when sensor and assessment systems are tuned to maximize their performance in the 
deployment terrain.  Tuning requires a period of monitoring and adjustment.  Tuning times for a 
VPED system are currently a few hours to a few days during initial system installation. 
The current VPED system consists of sensor nodes (Figure 5-14) that support sensor transducers 
and cluster nodes (Figure 5-15) that provide video assessment capability.  Both sensor and clus-
ter nodes use radio frequency links to send data to a command center and provide 360-degree 
                                                 
38Because a VPED system is typically deployed in a natural (i.e., unengineered) environment, the system, at any one 
sensor, may experience a higher than usual nuisance alarm rate when compared to the rate from a sensor in a PIDAS 
where the environment has been engineered.  Therefore a VPED system is normally installed only for those loca-
tions where advance knowledge of a potential threat incursion is worth the higher nuisance alarm rate or may be 
installed and subsequently used only during heightened states of security awareness when a higher nuisance alarm 
rate is acceptable. 
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field-of-view coverage.  Sensor nodes are self-powered using internal batteries and can operate 
for more than two years on internal power.  Cluster nodes are powered by solar panels and pro-
vide both day and night assessment and sensor fusion capabilities. 
  
Figure 5-14.  Virtual Presence and Ex-
tended Detection sensor 
node. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-15.  Virtual Presence and Ex-
tended Detection cluster 
node. 
 
A VPED system also includes software to help reduce nuisance alarms, also known as the nui-
sance alarm rate (NAR).  Four technologies are used to reduce the NAR: 
• intelligent senor algorithms that attempt to classify detections as persons, vehicles, or 
other 
• sensor fusion that combines multiple sensors to provide more accurate detection 
• video assessment to allow operators to determine the cause of a detection notification 
without having to dispatch patrols 
• a user interface that can be operated effectively under high sensor alarm conditions 
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These techniques help a VPED system reduce NAR to levels that make beyond-the-perimeter 
sensor systems effective despite their deployment in unconstrained external environments (where 
administrative measures, i.e., controls, are not effective). 
The VPED system has its own stand-alone user interface for users without a command and con-
trol system.  The VPED user interface is web browser-based and can be deployed quickly almost 
anywhere on a user’s network.  For users who do have a command and control system, VPED is 
designed to work with other display systems through standard network interfaces such as XML.  
The VPED system can be quickly customized to work with most modern network-based com-
mand and control systems. 
VPED equipment was prototyped in 2005 and in 2007 a second-generation system was deployed 
in several field applications to validate system operation. 
For additional information contact: 
David Kitterman, Manager 
Virtual Presence and Extended Defenses Department 
Dept. 6428 
(505) 844-6853 
dlkitte@sandia.gov 
5.7 Long Range Acoustical Device 
The Long Range Acoustical Device™ (LRAD®) is a hailing, notification, and warning system 
produced by American Technology Corporation (ATC).  The LRAD® 1000 system is shown in 
Figures 5-16 and 5-17.  The LRAD® uses a piezoelectric transducer phase array to produce a nar-
row 30-degree acoustical beam that can effectively project intelligible speech out to approxi-
mately 300 m over land and warning tones out to approximately 600 m.  A VoxTec International 
Phraselator® can be utilized with the LRAD® to provide selectable warnings and instructions that 
have been translated into a multitude of different languages. 
 
Figure 5-16. Long Range Acoustical Device™ 1000 law enforcement use (Images 
courtesy of American Technology Corporation). 
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Figure 5-17. Backside image of Sandia National Laboratories’ ATC Long Range 
Acoustical Device™ 1000 evaluation system showing the simple 
control interfaces. 
The LRAD® provides a cost-effective means to remotely assess, deter, and establish the intent of 
unidentified/unauthorized personnel approaching or entering restricted areas.  With positive de-
termination of intent established, the use of greater force and lethality can be exercised. 
The LRAD® 1000 weighs approximately 65 lb, has a diameter of approximately 33 in., and re-
quires less than 400 W at full power output.  A typical unit cost is approximately $35K.  In addi-
tion to the manually aimed system shown, ATC has integrated the unit with the Common Re-
motely Operated Weapon System, a platform that allows different devices to be installed and 
controlled, and plans to offer its own pan/tilt unit with remote command and control. 
For additional information contact: 
Steven H. Scott, Manager 
Active Response and Denial Dept. 
Dept. 6422 
(505) 845-8149 
shscott@sandia.gov 
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5.8 Sticky Foam 
Sticky foam is a multi-component polymeric resin dissolved in a solvent.  When the solution is 
deployed, a low-density foam is formed that is capable of inhibiting movement and obscuring the 
object it covers from view.  A number of formulations of non-hardening sticky foam have been 
developed for security applications, including an acrylic-based sticky foam with a broader tem-
perature range of use and superior solvent resistance.   
The sticky foams have expansion ratios ranging from approximately 20:1 to 60:1 depending on 
the formulation and temperature.  The foam density depends on formulation, temperature, and 
dispensing technique and varies from about 1.2 to 3.5 lb/ft3.  The volume stability of dispensed 
sticky foam depends primarily on formulation and temperature.  Volume stability ranges from 
about 30 minutes to greater than four hours with the reduction in volume less than about 30%.  
Because the foam is non-hardening, it collapses after a period of time.  The material is aggres-
sively tacky and becomes tougher when collapsed. 
Sticky foam can be a very effective active delay component of a physical protection system.  The 
intent of the use of sticky foam is to foul tools and to cause intruders to become entangled in the 
foam and stick to themselves and their equipment.  Figures 5-18 and 5-19 show two photos in 
which an attacker attempts to remove a sticky foam-covered item.  These photos demonstrate 
both the elasticity and the tenacity of the sticky foam material.  Using it in combination with 
other barriers such as tie-downs, cables, barbed steel bands, and other deployable barriers can 
enhance the effectiveness of sticky foam.  Sticky foam provides significantly increased delay ef-
fectiveness. 
The rubber-based sticky foam material costs approximately $10/ft3 of volume to be filled.  The 
acrylic sticky foam is nearly twice the cost of the rubber-based sticky foam.  The dispensing sys-
tem cost depends on the dispensing technique used.  Sticky foam systems can be either very sim-
ple passive systems activated by the adversary=s attack or sophisticated activated systems requir-
ing complex command and control systems and dispensing hardware.  Thus costs may range 
from $67/ft3 of dispensed sticky foam for a fairly simple system to $1,600/ft3 of dispensed ex-
panded material for an activated system.  This does not include the cost of the Command and 
Control system for the activated system.  The dispensing system cost may be decreased with ad-
ditional development and quantity fabrication.  Production dispensing hardware also exists. 
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Figure 5-18. Attacker attempting to remove 
object covered in sticky foam. 
Figure 5-19. Attacker attempting to remove 
object covered in sticky foam. 
 
For additional information contact: 
Steven H. Scott, Manager 
Active Response and Denial Dept. 
Dept. 6422 
(505) 845-8149 
shscott@sandia.gov 
5.9 Obscurants and Deployable Barriers 
Activated dispensable materials (see examples in Figures 5-20 through 5-22) are generally used 
to augment other barriers to deter, delay, or disrupt adversaries.  These dispensables can be used 
to physically impede an adversary or to physiologically interfere with an adversary’s sensory in-
puts, such as obscured vision, olfactory irritants, and impaired hearing.  Examples of these dis-
pensables include sticky foam, rigid foam, aqueous foam, visual obscurants, and a variety of irri-
tant and inflammatory chemicals.  For access delay applications the deployment of these materi-
als is designed to be non-lethal; however, several of the dispensables can be high penalty in 
terms of cleanup and safety risk and must incorporate a high-reliability command and control 
activation system.  Activated dispensable delay technologies can significantly increase overall 
access delay when used in conjunction with substantial passive barriers. 
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Figure 5-20. Deployable 
barriers. 
Figure 5-21. Cold smoke 
fogger. 
Figure 5-22. Caltrops and 
sticky foam. 
Dispensable materials can be used to complement passive structural-type barriers to defeat or to 
delay adversaries.  Dispensables can be broken into two broad classes based on their function.  
These classes are 1) entombing and blocking materials and 2) sensory-interfering materials.  De-
ployable barriers are objects such as caltrops and barbed steel bands that can be used alone or in 
combination with other dispensable materials to provide a synergistic delay effect.  Considera-
tions regarding their use in access delay applications include cleanup, toxicology, safety, com-
mand and control, and waste.   
Sensory-interfering materials make up the second general class of dispensable materials.  They 
include obscurants such as cold chemical smoke, terephthalic acid, pyrotechnic smoke, gly-
col/water and mineral oil fogs, and aqueous foam.  Sensory irritants and inflammatory agents 
like the riot control agents ortho-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile (CS) and oleoresin capsicum 
(OC) respectively, are also included in this class of dispensables.  Obscurants are effective be-
cause they reduce an adversary=s vision.  This forces him to take additional time to figure out 
what he must do to succeed.  Obscurants also force the adversary to be more cautious so as not to 
accidentally injure fellow team members.  Finally, additional adversary task time is consumed 
troubleshooting equipment problems that arise on the scene and improvising solutions.  The de-
lay effectiveness of the visual obscurants also depends upon the task to be performed.  The effec-
tiveness increases as the level of eye-hand coordination required to perform the task increases. 
Aqueous foam is not only a visual obscurant; it is also effective against infrared-imaging de-
vices.  Aqueous foam attenuates sound and restricts conversation among adversaries.  Communi-
cation between adversary team members is a vital function if any unforeseen obstacles or com-
plications arise during the adversary attack.  However, with advances in portable radio transmit-
ters, it may not be possible to totally mask oral communication between properly equipped per-
sons. 
Sensory irritants and inflammatory agents can be used with the obscurants and in some cases, 
mixed and dispensed simultaneously.  Irritants are effective because they force the adversary into 
protective clothing and breathing equipment.  The effect of these agents upon humans is either 
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temporary incapacitation or physical encumbrance, depending upon whether or not personal pro-
tective gear is worn.  The desired effect is temporary incapacitation.   
Deployable barriers are normally deployed in conjunction with other dispensables for effective 
delay.  The combined delay effectiveness can range from moderate to high.  The cost for simple 
devices can be as low as $2 to $5 each for caltrops, whereas complex devices such as a concer-
tina portcullis (i.e., a downwardly deployable wall of concertina wire) can cost approximately 
$250K.  Design costs are not included. 
When multiple dispensables are used in combination in fixed-site protection systems, there can 
be a synergistic effect on the delay they provide; that is, the delay increases by a factor greater 
than the sum of the individual delay factors. 
For additional information contact: 
Steven H. Scott, Manager 
Active Response and Denial Dept. 
Dept. 6422 
(505) 845-8149 
shscott@sandia.gov 
5.10 A Munitions-Based Access Denial System 
A Munitions-Based Access Denial System (MBADS) provides lethal denial capabilities to facili-
ties with high-value assets (Figure 5-24).  The MBADS utilizes conventional shotgun-style am-
munition to provide a wide zone of lethal fire.  Multiple units can be covertly placed within a 
facility at doorways and in hallways.  They also can be situated to provide complete cross-fire 
floor coverage of an entire area. 
The MBADS development project leverages technology developed in the ROWS program by 
using the System Enable Disable Switch (SEDS) function technology to enable the system acti-
vation.  The SEDS technology relies on mechanical switch contact closures to enable the system, 
thus eliminating the need for costly software-driven command and control systems to activate the 
MBADS. 
A fire set has been designed to provide timed sequential triggering of ten volleys of shotgun mu-
nitions.  The delay times between volleys can be pre-programmed to provide time-delayed lethal 
fire into the targeted area.  The time-delayed firing sequence provides both extended access de-
lay times as well as laying down a zone of lethal fire around high-value assets. 
The Command and Control station (Figure 5-24) for MBADS is located away from the firing 
unit in a secure location.  The system is remotely fired.  It is a standard electronics console about 
24 in. wide, 36 in. deep, and 60 in. high.  When oriented in the vertical position, the MBADS 
firing unit is about 12 in. by 12 in. by 84 in. long.  It weighs approximately 325 lb.  The firing 
unit can be mounted vertically or horizontally on the wall or can be suspended from the ceiling.  
It can be installed behind sheetrock or thin wall coverings or hung above suspended ceiling tiles 
for concealment and surprise attack. 
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Figure 5-23. Munitions-Based Access De-
nial System, shield opening. 
Figure 5-24. Munitions-Based Access De-
nial System (MBADS) com-
mand and control system, fire 
set, and MBADS assembly. 
The command and control system requires two 120-V, 60-Hz, 20-amp circuits.  The same power 
is also required by a control box in the room where the firing unit is located. 
The hardware cost to field one command and control system and eight MBADS firing units is 
$315K.  Seventy rounds per unit can be fired.  This cost does not include infrastructure upgrades 
to any site installing the hardware; neither does it include any Safety Certification cost.  A total 
system cost is typically several times the cost of the hardware alone. 
For additional information contact: 
Steven H. Scott, Manager 
Active Response and Denial Dept. 
Dept. 6422 
(505) 845-8149 
shscott@sandia.gov 
Mark McAllaster 
MBADS Project Lead 
Dept. 6422 
(505) 845-8349 
memcall@sandia.gov 
5.11 Gabion-Filled Walls 
Thick, heavily reinforced walls can be penetrated fairly quickly using explosives.  One alterna-
tive that has been proposed to provide additional delay is gabion-filled walls (Figures 5-25 and 
5-26).  These consist of an outer wall and an inner wall, with the space between them filled with 
loose rock.  The intent of using the gabion material is to form a self-healing wall that will refill 
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the hole created in the wall by each successive attack.  If an adversary penetrates the outer wall, 
he has to remove a large amount of rock before he can penetrate the inner wall.  As he does so, 
additional rock from above will fall down to fill the hole he is excavating (Figures 5-27 through 
5-29). 
 
 
Figure 5-25. Gabion wall in stairwell. Figure 5-26. Gabion wall in stairwell. 
 
 
Figure 5-27. Prototype gabion wall construction showing small rock flow-
ing easily through rebar. 
 
 
Figure 5-28. Prototype gabion wall con-
struction showing large rock 
does not flow easily through 
rebar or small holes. 
Figure 5-29.  Typical gabion fill. 
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One-tenth scale-model tests of gabion-filled walls were conducted at SNL to gain insight into the 
behavior of these walls. 
Some of the considerations in designing gabion walls include the thickness and height of the 
walls and gabion fill, size of rock, whether the rock is rounded or crushed, the effect of rebar in 
the walls on gabion removal, whether there is room for the adversary to remove enough rock to 
reach the second wall, whether the rock will flow out of a hole in the wall on its own or if the 
adversary has to work to remove the rock, the cost of construction, long-term compaction and 
settling, angle of repose of the fill material in the wall and as it flows through a hole in the wall, 
and so forth. 
Gabion walls work best in enclosed hallways, stairwells, small rooms, areas with low ceilings, 
and other small confined areas where there will be more fill material than available space for the 
adversary to drain it into.  Gabion walls are less effective as exterior walls, in large rooms, or 
areas with high ceilings.  
It is better to make the adversaries work to remove the rock, rather than having it drain itself.  
Large rock, thick walls, heavy rebar reinforcement, large amounts of fill material, and small vol-
umes to drain the rock into are all more desirable. 
It is possible that gabion walls provide an additional benefit of reducing the effect of blast or 
other aggressive attacks.  Because the two walls are separated by a space, this serves to decouple 
the two walls, so that the shock from an explosive event does not couple as well into the second 
wall.  The intervening space and fill material may help to protect the second wall from robust 
explosive attack tools.  This has not been verified through performance tests. 
In designing a facility it is important to have a balanced design that makes all adversary attack 
paths into the facility equally difficult, either by their construction, location, confined working 
space, presence of response forces, or other design features.  Often the doors, ceiling, floors, and 
utility chases are much weaker than the walls.  If a gabion wall design or other design features 
make the walls very robust, careful consideration should also be given to these other attack 
paths. 
For additional information contact: 
Steven H. Scott, Manager 
Active Response and Denial Dept. 
Dept. 6422 
(505) 845-8149 
shscott@sandia.gov 
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5.12 Blue Force Tracking with TacNet (Situational Awareness) 
The Tactical Network (TacNet) is a wireless ad-hoc self-forming, self-healing network based on 
Motorola’s Mesh Network technology and SNL-developed tracking application software.39  It 
provides connectivity between agents (Blue Force) and convoy vehicles for seamless message 
transfer and situational awareness.  The TacNet infrastructure is scalable from a full vehicle con-
voy awareness system to an in-field tracker-to-tracker system as required. 
TacNet improves response force effectiveness by identifying friend and foe, providing situational 
awareness, and adding a whiteboard capability.  In-vehicle displays (Figure 5-30) with a white-
board allow Tactical Commanders to view a convoy and assets and place, move, and remove 
icons for good guys, bad guys, etc.  Others in the network will also see these icons on their elec-
tronic maps.  For an in-vehicle system, the TacNet module must interface with the vehicle com-
munications system via a router.  Trackers in the field enable response forces to see on their elec-
tronic maps their team mates, their vehicles, and any icons placed on the map by the Tactical 
Commander.  For a system of trackers sending data to a control center, the interface must have a 
router for wireless communications.  For tracker-to-tracker communications, the trackers can run 
as stand-alone units. 
Detection can also be provided if the tracker is integrated with radar detection. 
Trackers are about 9 in.3 in volume and can fit in standard response force clothing pockets.  
TacNet Vehicle Modules are about 8 in. by 9 in. by 4 in. (Figures 5-31 and 5-32).  The in-vehicle 
unit cost is $3K (plus $0.5K for a transceiver card).  TacNet with display is $1.2K (plus $0.5K 
for a transceiver card).  Without the display, the TacNet is $0.8K. 
For additional information contact: 
Loren Riblett 
TacNet Project Lead 
Communications Systems 
Dept. 6452 
(505) 845-8841 
lerible@sandia.gov 
                                                 
39Motorola, Inc. developed the MOTOMESH™ Multi-Radio Broadband Solution that allows the deployment of a 
single wireless network that provides both Wi-Fi access and separate, dedicated and secure access to mission critical 
communications.  Each MOTOMESH™ access point contains two standards-based 802.11 (Wi-Fi) radios and two 
of Motorola’s Mesh Enabled Architecture (MEA®) mobile broadband radios.  One set of Wi-Fi and MEA® radios 
operate in the unlicensed 2.4 GHz band, and one set operates in the licensed 4.9 GHz public safety band. MEA® 
radio users leverage Motorola=s Multi-Hopping® capabilities, turning each user into a router/repeater.  Thus MO-
TOMESH™ access points can be reached by hopping through other users, and each additional user makes the net-
work stronger—extending network coverage and creating more data paths through the network.  With the appropri-
ate tools and software, users of the network can receive instant access to information such as data, voice, and video.  
As with all MEA® radio systems, fast and accurate tracking capabilities are available without the use of global posi-
tioning system satellites. 
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Figure 5-30.  TacNet display on map in vehicle. 
  
Figure 5-31.  Outer view of tractor. Figure 5-32.  Tractor with layers removed. 
 
5.13 Underground Storage and Production Facilities with High 
Security Doors 
Subsequent to the events of September 11, 2001, the DoD revised its directives for munitions 
storage and production facilities for high-value assets.  The revised directives require considera-
tion of all threats, extensive use of active and passive denial systems, and advanced electronic 
security systems.  These DoD requirements emphasize detection, delay, and denial; consequently 
SNL has employed a synergistic approach to underground facility design using delay, denial, and 
detection systems working together to produce a deterrent greater than the sum of individual 
components (Figure 5-33).  The SNL design approach also attempts to use normal architectural 
layout and design features to achieve layered and enhanced delay/denial/detection with minimal 
added cost. 
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Figure 5-33.  Aerial view of buried complex concept. 
Addressing air threats is a complex technical issue; SNL has accomplished detailed numerical 
analyses using its super-computing facilities to develop a mix of energy-absorbing materials to 
meet the new design requirements for aerial protection of storage and production facilities.  Re-
cent explosives impacts testing performed for the DoD at SNL facilities have verified SNL’s de-
sign effectiveness. 
To increase the delay and denial capabilities of underground facilities, SNL has carefully inte-
grated ROWS and MBADS technologies (discussed in Sections 5.4 and 5.10) into areas of the 
facility design where adversarial forces are either temporarily stopped or channelized and the 
deadly force attributes of these weapon platforms are maximized.  Locating multiple ROWS in 
series along curved underground facility vehicle tunnels affords overlapping fields of fire, 
weapon platform protection from stand-off hostile fire, containment of small arms fire from the 
ROWS, and a highly effective killing zone in front of each gun because the tunnel provides no 
natural concealment to an adversary.  Similarly, MBADS are located at facility entry control 
points where foot-mounted adversary forces are canalized and can be effectively stopped before 
reaching critical storage areas. 
The entry doors to any secure storage and production facility typically represent the weakest and 
most vulnerable point in the facility for an enemy attack.  SNL working with industry developed 
high-security doors to meet aggressive adversarial attacks as defined in the new DoD standards 
thus enabling a balanced facility design from a delay-deny perspective.  The performance of the 
new high-security doors has been validated in testing conducted at SNL and manufacturer facili-
ties for the DoD.  The areas immediately surrounding each high-security door are equipped with 
access delay features to match the delay/denial characteristics of the high-security doors.   
In front of the high-security doors, ROWS are positioned to engage adversary forces and bring 
them under duress during attempts to defeat the high-security doors.  Behind the high-security 
doors (on the secure side), hardened fighting positions are integrated into normal facility parti-
tion walls; the hardened fighting positions provide a critical line of defense using an architectural 
feature of the facility.  Delay and denial in-depth are further layered into the facility design by 
incorporation of high-security control of required blast doors entering storage zones within the 
facility; blast doors, by design, are robust enough to offer some delay/denial if door openings are 
controlled. 
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Currently SNL is working to develop automated alarm, control, and display and entry control 
systems for control and monitoring of authorized personnel in the most sensitive reaches of the 
complex.  These systems will accomplish a check of personnel identities, Personnel Reliability 
Program status, shift code, areas of authorized access within the facility, tracking of personnel in 
critical areas, and control of active denial systems. 
For additional information contact: 
Steven H. Scott, Manager 
Active Response and Denial Dept. 
Dept. 6422 
(505) 845-8149 
shscott@sandia.gov 
5.14 Smart Camera and Three-Dimensional Video Motion Detection 
and Assessment 
5.14.1 Smart Camera 
The Smart Camera is a stand-alone, high-end, digital video surveillance system that uses stan-
dard PC microprocessor and local area network technology (Figure 5-34).  The embedded mi-
croprocessor (within the camera module) allows automated preliminary scene analysis and 
alarm/notification-level decision-making, which lowers false alarm rates and reduces the amount 
of operator interactions.  The camera=s on-board storage buffer captures approximately 120 sec-
onds of full motion video that can be accessed for alarm assessment. 
 
Figure 5-34.  Prototype smart camera. 
The Smart Camera technology provides many advanced features over traditional analog closed-
circuit television systems, including: 
• encryption and authentication for control and video data communications between cam-
era module and host/viewer computer, which prevents spoofing and makes the system 
tamper-proof 
• multiple-user viewing and control capability 
• remote software modification and update capability 
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• robust system maintenance tools 
• loop recording or instant replay capability 
• application programming interfaces for ease of system enhancement or modifications by 
end users or third-party providers 
– digitally enhanced features, including 
– object recognition 
– scene analysis 
– intelligent alarm processing 
– remote camera tilt, pan, and zoom 
The smart camera can be deployed in a wireless configuration and with encryption authentication 
control and other advanced features can provide significant advantages over conventional camera 
systems.  Figure 5-35 shows a prototype smart camera with an encrypted 802.11 link and 80W 
solar power system.  
 
Figure 5-35.  Prototype solar powered smart camera with wireless link. 
For additional information contact: 
Virgil Kohlhepp 
Advanced Communications and Signal Processing Group 
(925) 424-4486 
kohlhepp1@llnl.gov 
The Smart Camera has been applied in conjunction with another breakthrough technology, the 
Three-Dimensional Video Motion Detection (3DVMD) and Assessment system described below. 
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5.14.2 Three-Dimensional Video Motion Detection and Assessment 
The 3DVMD system is a stand-alone sensor system that operates on a single PC platform and 
uses multiple cameras to monitor activity in predefined, three-dimensional volumes of space 
(Figure 5-36).  Detected activity is displayed on the PC monitor as an overlay to real-time video 
imagery.  The basic sensor can provide switch closures for an interface to an alarm communica-
tion and display (AC&D) system.  High-level detection information relating to the size, location, 
and direction of motion of moving objects can be provided for assessment purposes.  Using this 
high-level information, 3DVMD can be used to monitor individual items as well as track people 
within the monitored area.  It can be used for two-person rule verification, process control, and 
the detection of anomalies during evacuation procedures.  Specific applications within nuclear 
power plants could include monitoring mixed oxide fuel assemblies after delivery, utilization as 
a sophisticated tamper indication device for sensitive component areas, and as a video motion 
detection system for surveilled areas that will alleviate the necessity for an officer to watch a 
video terminal with a far less nuisance alarm rate than conventional video motion detection.  The 
3DVMD system can be implemented as an interior or exterior sensor. 
 
Figure 5-36. Interior monitoring:  high-resolution detection of multiple people 
tossing a ball. 
There are several benefits to the 3DVMD technology. It is a passive security sensor.  It provides 
high-level information (e.g., location, size, direction of motion) that can be used as an assess-
ment aid in CCTV video, where it is often difficult to even see an intruder.  Its detection volume 
is user-definable and remains static until changed by the user.  This reduces vulnerabilities intro-
duced by the variable detection envelope of other sensors.  It has reduced nuisance and false 
alarm rates as compared to traditional two-dimensional video motion detection sensors.  The 
technology also has built-in redundancy.  If a camera fails, the system can adjust to operate with-
out that camera, down to a minimum of two cameras.  A 3DVMD system also has a self-
assessment (i.e., state of health) capability.  Because CCTV sensors are an integral component of 
the 3DVMD system, the failure of or tampering with any CCTV sensor is immediately identi-
fied. 
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The 3DVMD technology can be fielded either as a stand-alone security system or as part of an 
integrated security system that provides switch closures to an existing AC&D system.  Minimal 
software development is required to customize the technology for specific applications.   
The 3DVMD system has been tested in both interior and exterior environments [Ref. 13].  It has 
been demonstrated to monitor individual items and to monitor multiple volumes, each with a dif-
ferent level of alarm status.  The technology provides assessment information, which generally is 
not coupled with detection in a sensor system.  The assessment data is immediately available to 
an operator, allowing critical decisions in a timely manner. 
The baseline 3DVMD system is a stand-alone sensor system that operates on a single PC plat-
form. The sensor uses multiple cameras to monitor activity in predefined, 3D zones or voxels.40  
The 3DVMD sensor technology was developed for detection and assessment in security applica-
tions.  It provides high detection capabilities with a low nuisance alarm rate.  It is based on the 
input from multiple cameras and relies on a user-defined volume of space for monitoring.  The 
3DVMD technology provides significant high-level information about activity within a moni-
tored volume that can be used for assessment information and for input to further processing for 
more advanced security applications.  The developed technology is video-based, but it is not a 
system that requires continual viewing by a human operator.  The high-level information can be 
used to specifically define and extract the activity that would cause an alarm condition.  Minimal 
software development is required to customize the technology for specific applications. 
Hardware cost depends on the cameras and central processing unit (CPU) chosen.  Cameras 
range from about $300 to $3000; their selection depends on the application.  A CPU costs about 
$2000 to $4000, again depending on application.  Framegrabbers are required if analog cameras 
are used.  A network switch is required if network cameras are chosen.  The coverage area is 
user-defined.  The footprint for system componentry depends on the placement of cameras (for 
example, on towers or mounted on walls).  The CPU is the size of a small computer.  Power is 
required to operate the cameras and the CPU. 
For additional information contact: 
Cynthia Nelson 
Virtual Presence and Extended Defenses Department 
Dept. 6428 
(505) 844-9493 
clnelso@sandia.gov 
5.15 Automated Screening Systems 
5.15.1 Automated Access Control 
Automated access control includes accomplishing several functions: 
                                                 
40 A voxel (VOlume piXEL) is a 3D pixel representing a quantity of 3D data just, as a pixel represents a point (or 
points) in 2D data. 
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• identity verification – an authorized person must possess a valid ID card, key fob, or per-
sonal identification number 
• personnel verification – some form of biometric is used to verify that the person hold-
ing/possessing the ID is indeed the person he or she claims to be 
• anti-piggybacking – detection and prevention of an authorized person from intentionally 
bringing in an unauthorized person with him 
• anti-tailgating – detection and prevention of an unauthorized person from entering a facil-
ity by taking advantage of an authorized person=s entrance 
• anti-passback – detection and prevention of a weapon or other contraband being passed 
from outside a facility into the secured area 
Several commercial products have automated these functions such that security personnel are not 
needed except in the event of an exception (i.e., lost ID card, visitor, etc.).  These products are 
usually a set of revolving doors or an enclosed portal (see Figure 5-37).  Identity and personnel 
verification are fairly standard or may be easily customized for a particular facility.  Software 
algorithms that use data from either photo cells or cameras also prevent piggybacking, tailgating, 
and passback in some of these products.  The latest advances in this area involve the use of what 
is commonly referred to as stereo vision, where the feedback from two cameras looking at the 
same scene allow for sophisticated determination of the number of people trying to enter the fa-
cility—much as a person=s two eyes allow for depth perception. 
 
 
Figure 5-37.  Commercially available access control revolving door system. 
The footprint of these automated access portals can vary between roughly 3 ft by 3 ft up to 7 ft 
by 7 ft.  Depending on the type of doors used (such as revolving, sliding, etc.), most units will 
require 110 and 220 power.  Maintenance tends to be minimal—a thorough cleaning and/or 
greasing of the mechanism one to four times a year.  These units range in price from $60K to 
over $100K each. 
For additional information contact: 
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Mary Green 
Security Systems and Technology Center 
Dept. 6461 
(505) 284-5424 
mgreen@sandia.gov 
5.15.2 Automated Metal/Weapon Detection 
Automated metal or weapon detection incorporates a standard metal detector in a portal such that 
a person entering an enclosed portal booth will be instantly alerted if metal has been detected.  
That person must then exit the portal through the same door they entered.  If no metal is detected 
in the portal, the person is allowed to exit the portal through a second door that leads into the se-
cured area (see Figure 5-38). 
Detection 
Sensor
Detection 
Sensor
Entrance 
Door from 
Open Area
Exit Door 
to Secure 
Area
 
Figure 5-38.  Notational diagram of an automated metal or weapon detection portal. 
 
This unit can greatly reduce manpower normally used in a typical screening process, as it places 
the burden upon the users of divesting themselves of metal objects until they are able to pass 
through the unit.  However, it will always be necessary to have security personnel available to 
hand scan a person who is unable to determine what is causing the detector to alarm.  It is also 
recommended that there always be oversight personnel capable of protected overwatch in the 
area as a knowledgeable adversary may be able to defeat this type of unit.  The footprint of this 
product can vary from about 4 ft to 8 ft in either a rectangular or circular format.  These units can 
range in price from $90K to over $120K. 
For additional information contact: 
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Mary Green 
Security Systems and Technology Center 
Dept. 6461 
(505) 284-5424 
mgreen@sandia.gov 
5.15.3 Automated Explosives Detection 
Trace and bulk explosives detection that collects and analyzes surface or air samples is discussed 
in detail in Section 5.2.  Security personnel must be present to prevent a person from by-passing 
or spoofing the system.  
Millimeter-wave technology uses millimeter-wave cameras to screen for anomalies on a person=s 
body (Figure 5-39).  These devices, which may be active or passive, must be located approxi-
mately 10 ft from a person and must be able to view the person for approximately 2 seconds, ei-
ther while walking or standing.  A person must be funneled through a fairly narrow corridor 
(~ 3 ft wide) so that no other person can come between the subject and the millimeter-wave 
unit(s).  This process is completely automated up to this point as the software that receives the 
millimeter-wave unit=s data will identify any anomalies detected and then alarm.  A detected 
anomaly does not always indicate explosives, which prevents this procedure from being totally 
automated.  If a person is not completely divested of non-clothing items before being examined 
by the millimeter-wave unit, an alarm will occur and a security person must respond. 
 
 
Figure 5-39.  Millimeter-wave cameras examining a subject for anomalies. 
 
The footprint of a millimeter-wave unit is fairly small—about 18 in. by 18 in.  The space re-
quired for using these devices will be 10 ft for each direction—usually in front and in back of a 
person.  Millimeter-wave camera systems cost between $50K and $80K each, with one unit re-
quired for each direction of view.  
For additional information contact: 
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Eric Varley 
Security Systems and Technology Center 
Dept. 6418 
(505) 844-0764 
esvarle@sandia.gov 
5.16 Perimeter Surveillance Radar System 
Perimeter-monitoring, surveillance, and intrusion-alarm-and-tracking systems (see Figure 5-40 
for examples) are commercially available, with production units in the field, and have been per-
formance tested and compared.  Tests were performed to determine baseline probability of 
sense41 values at specified ranges under specified conditions and to quantify the effects of terrain 
and environmental factors (e.g., rain, high winds) on system performance.  Limited data were 
gathered to characterize each system=s NAR.42  System characteristics, capabilities, and observed 
reliability issues were noted and documented for comparison purposes. 
 
Figure 5-40.  Examples of commercially available ground-based perimeter radar systems. 
Ground-based radar (GBR) systems are designed for beyond-the-perimeter surveillance with the 
goal of providing early warning detection and tracking at low cost and low NAR.  The systems 
scan areas with advertised sensing ranges of human-sized and vehicle-sized targets anywhere 
from 350 m (short-range GBR) to 10 km (long-range GBR) from the sensor unit.  Radar sensors 
use reflected signals from targets to detect, locate, and track intrusions.   
Both long- and short-range ground surveillance radar (GSR) systems require a line of sight from 
the radar antenna to the target and operate most effectively in open areas with minimal vegeta-
tion.  A fence line located in a relatively flat, open area with minimal, low-growing vegetation 
and up to 1 km of open space on the inside of the fence line (depending on the radar system) is 
the most likely application for GSR systems.  The radar system itself needs to have detection 
range-limiting settings and functions, or masking capabilities, in order to ignore alarms from 
movement in populated areas outside the fence. 
                                                 
41These tests were not conducted to determine probability of detection.  They were designed and conducted to de-
termine whether the sensor would sense the occurrence of an event within the sensor=s field-of-view.  
42Ideally, sufficient data would be collected and analyzed so that an estimate for the false alarm rate could be deter-
mined.  This was not possible because of resource constraints imposed on the testing regimen. 
 101 
Most GBR systems are provided with a graphical user interface (GUI) that can alert the operator 
during an intrusion, display and log the location and time of the intrusion, and allow the operator 
varying degrees of control and configuration of the GBR from the GUI. These systems have the 
capability to detect movement beyond the fence; however, the fence fabric can decrease sensitiv-
ity, especially at shallow angles to the fence line.  Limited testing has shown that these radar sys-
tems will detect wildlife (large birds, rabbits, coyotes, etc.) and wind-induced movement of 
vegetation.  In an area with significant wildlife activity, the NAR can be high.  Heavy rain may 
also cause many nuisance alarms.  On the display, alarms can appear as single or multiple hits 
(blips) that may or may not appear to have purposeful movement.  The operator monitoring the 
display must therefore decide, with the aid of video assessment, which alarms are caused by nui-
sance sources and which are intrusion attempts. 
Control of assessment cameras (i.e., infrared thermal and/or visible daylight) and camera posi-
tioning units has been integrated into some of the long-range radar systems.  In those systems, 
the operator selects a target from the radar display for assessment.  The radar system then pro-
vides coordinates and range information in a message packet sent to a pan/tilt zoom control unit.  
The camera then slews to the location of the target for assessment. 
Costs range between $40K and $250K, depending on components, performance, and other sys-
tem variables of system capabilities. 
For additional information contact: 
Frank Griffin 
Security Systems and Technology Center 
Dept. 642321 
(505) 284-2599 
fwgriff@sandia.gov 
 
5.17 Counter-Sniper Remotely Operated Weapon System 
One new tool that provides quick and effective response to sniper fire onto a nuclear site uses the 
ROWS, previously described in Section 5.4.  The Counter-Sniper ROWS (CSR) integrates the 
data from midwave infrared detectors, which are capable of detecting a muzzle flash, with data 
from acoustic detectors, which are capable of detecting the crack or bang of a gunshot.  The re-
sults of combining these data both detect the sniper fire and determine the location of origination.  
A network of ROWS platforms are then slewed to the target box location identified by the com-
bined data from the acoustic and infrared detectors.  An authorized operator then performs final 
aiming and weapon firing (Figures 5-41 through 5-45).  An installation would require several 
infrared detectors, a number of acoustic detectors, several weapon platforms, and a control cen-
ter.  The actual installation depends upon site configuration and lines of sight. 
Hardware costs for a basic installation with four infrared detectors, eight acoustic detectors, and 
four weapon platforms are estimated to be $2M.  A more complicated site configuration will re-
quire more detectors and weapon platforms to achieve reasonable coverage.  Infrastructure re-
quirements include towers to raise the equipment to give line of sight to potential sniper loca-
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tions, 120 VAC power to each equipment site, and fiber optic communications linking each 
equipment site.  Installation, safety certification, testing, and training for a basic system will be 
$4M. 
 
  
Figure 5-41. Counter-sniper infrared  
detector. 
Figure 5-42. Counter-sniper acoustic  
detector. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-43.  Example of a Remotely Operated Weapon System platform. 
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Figure 5-44. Counter-Sniper Remotely Op-
erated Weapon System over-
view screen. 
Figure 5-45. Counter-Sniper Remotely Op-
erated Weapon System target 
screen. 
 
For additional information contact: 
Steven H. Scott, Manager 
Active Response and Denial Dept. 
Dept. 6422 
(505) 845-8149 
shscott@sandia.gov 
5.18 Transparent Personnel-Shielding System 
Developed at SNL for containment of a high-speed centrifuge, this unique security barrier can be 
installed quickly and economically for a wide variety of personnel-shielding applications.  (See 
Figure 5-46 for an example application.)  This containment system was tested with a 32-lb steel 
projectile traveling at approximately 60 MPH (88 ft/s). The polycarbonate thickness as tested is 
2 in.; however, the design can accommodate a thickness range of 3 in. to : in.  A bulletproof 
polycarbonate laminate, such as Lexgard®, could also be installed for protection against small 
arms fire. 
Several commercially available products are combined in this unique shielding system that is far 
less expensive and quicker to build than the 4-ft-thick concrete walls or underground bunkers 
normally relied on for safety containment of heavy rotating machinery in the unlikely event of an 
accident.  The first installed system at a DOE site was built in four days for about $30K, about 
one-tenth the cost of the proposed conventional containment structure of concrete and steel. 
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Figure 5-46. Patented polycarbonate/Unistrut® security barrier pro-
tects workers from flying debris. 
The barrier system includes sheets of polycarbonate (clear plastic, such as Lexan®) glazed into 
frames made from Unistrut7, which are commercially available, pre-drilled steel bracings that fit 
together like pieces of a giant erector set. In industrial settings, Unistrut® is commonly used to 
create overhead tracks for electrical conduit, racks, shelving, stairs, and other structures.  For 
machine containment, the impact-resistant transparent sheets provide the advantage of allowing 
operators to safely see the machinery behind the barrier during operation.  For security applica-
tions, the transparent, modular, easy-to-install barriers can shield people from bomb blast shrap-
nel and terrorist small arms.  It could be used in personnel portal applications and in bullet proof 
guard booths, among other uses.  Sandia National Laboratories recently received a US patent on 
the modular barrier system for both machine-containment and security applications. 
For additional information contact: 
Keith Snyder, 
Test Equipment Design Department 
Dept. 2956, 
(505) 844-6892 
kwsnyder@sandia.gov 
5.19 Silent Defender® Security Barrier 
The Silent Defender® security barrier is an advanced security barrier in the configuration of a 
vestibule (see Figure 5-47).  It has been designed by security experts to thwart attempts by well-
equipped and well-trained adversaries attempting to enter critical and/or sensitive structures.  Al-
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though it functions as a normal door (see Figures 5-48 through 5-50), the Silent Defender7 is a 
penetration-resistant modular passageway.43 
 
Figure 5-47. Top down cutaway view of Silent Defender® module attached to exist-
ing building. 
   
Figure 5-48. Silent  
Defender® 
normal door 
function:  
approach. 
Figure 5-49. Silent  
Defender® 
normal door 
function:  
opening. 
Figure 5-50. Silent  
Defender® 
normal door 
function:  
closing. 
                                                 
43Figures for door function are from test structures.  Actual doors would be enclosed by the vestibule. 
Original Building 
Silent Defender 
Vestibule 
Normal Personnel Door
air shaft 
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The Silent Defender® is difficult and time-consuming to defeat, thus allowing sufficient time for 
security forces to assemble and respond to any attack, including the use of explosives.  It is com-
prised of a concrete vestibule, a door frame, and a penetration-resistant security door that con-
tains reactive delay features (see Figure 5-47).  The vestibule is reinforced and follows SNL’s 
barrier guidelines.  It is attached to the customer’s existing building as a foyer in front of the ex-
isting doorway (see Figure 5-47).  The exterior security door is an armored steel front- and back-
face, reinforced with a steel grating (see Figure 5-51).  Between the layers of grating are tubes 
filled with a foaming chemical agent.  Also woven into the substructure is a cable system that 
flexes under extreme pressure (see Figure 5-52).  The result is a barrier so formidable that even 
great amounts of explosives prove ineffective against it (see Figure 5-53).  Unfortunately for an 
aggressor, the explosive charge fractures the internal tubes, instantly releasing a sticky foam that 
pools in front of the door, delaying any further aggressive action (see Figure 5-54).44 
  
Figure 5-51. Silent Defender® door  
construction. 
Figure 5-52. Silent Defender® door  
construction: details. 
  
Figure 5-53. Silent Defender® being sub-
jected to an explosion. 
Figure 5-54. Silent Defender® with sticky 
foam pooled in front of door. 
The Silent Defender® is manufactured by construction professionals who ensure that all aspects 
of the manufacturing are monitored with the strictest quality controls. Because it is a modular 
design, the Silent Defender® can be manufactured off site and delivered to the customer=s loca-
tion (see Figure 5-55) or constructed on site (see Figures 5-56 and 5-57).  Off-site manufacturing 
minimizes the construction and security concerns that may affect the customer.  Once the mod-
ules are complete, the Silent Defender® is attached to the existing structure in a relatively fast 
and simple process. 
                                                 
44Figure for the door is from a test structure.  Actual doors would be enclosed by the vestibule. 
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Figure 5-55. Silent  
Defender® 
module deliv-
ered to site. 
Figure 5-56. Silent  
Defender® 
module being 
constructed on 
site: door 
frame place-
ment. 
Figure 5-57. Silent  
Defender® 
module being 
constructed on 
site: concrete 
pour. 
 
The Silent Defender® has been tested thoroughly with the assistance of the United States Air 
Force and Navy demolition specialists (see Figure 5-58).  In test after test, with increasingly 
higher levels of explosives, the Silent Defender® remained a viable barrier.  Moderate-sized 
holes that normally would have been adequate for intruders to pass through proved too difficult 
to penetrate due to the pool of foam and metal shrapnel on and around the door (see Figures 5-59 
through 5-61).45 
 
  
Figure 5-58. Silent Defender® testing team 
placing explosives. 
Figure 5-59. Hole resulting from use of ex-
plosives on Silent Defender®. 
                                                 
45Figures for the doors are from test structures.  Actual doors would be enclosed by the vestibule. 
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Figure 5-60. Shrapnel around hole in Silent 
Defender® door. 
Figure 5-61. Sticky foam deployment from 
Silent Defender® door after 
explosion. 
Silent Defender® protects resources, without the need for posting (additional) stationary guards 
at vital area entryways, thereby eliminating recurring personnel costs.  Installing the Silent De-
fender® is a one-time expense.  The Silent Defender7 security barrier requires only routine main-
tenance and preventive maintenance.  Calculations based on average costs indicate the Silent De-
fender’s® payback period can be less than twelve months, depending on the application. 
For additional information contact: 
David Huttie 
Director of Emergency Services Division 
Arizona Public Service 
(623) 393-3525 
Albert.HuttieJr@aps.com) 
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6. OBSERVATIONS AND INSIGHTS FROM  
THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT 
The following section lists the conclusions from the original report and comments on the appli-
cability of the original conclusion considering today=s threat environment and the target audience 
to which this report is written (i.e., designers/builders of new commercial nuclear power plants).  
Finally, a concluding observation is provided that contrasts the focus of the original report with 
the focus of this report. 
Conclusion 1: Structural design changes for pressurized water reactor plants (i.e., changes to 
building or plant arrangement) in and of themselves do not appear to provide 
significant additional protection against either the external or internal sabotage 
threat.  Stated another way, all other things being equal, mere arrangement does 
not lead to significant changes in protection. 
Comment: While this report does not address the details of current threat spectrum, most 
readers would agree that what might be considered in the current threat spec-
trum is somewhat different today than what was considered in the expected 
threat spectrum of the late 1970s and early 1980s.  Thus, it is not necessarily 
surprising that the above conclusion was reached.  However, with the current 
potential threat environment and this report=s target audience, i.e., designers of 
new facilities, facility designers should consider building and plant arrangement 
when designing a facility. 
Conclusion 2: Design changes can facilitate the implementation of more effective physical 
protection systems.  For example: 
• Design changes that restrict vital area access to a few well-defined routes, if 
appropriately combined with administrative controls and work rules, can in-
crease the protection against the insider threat. 
• Design changes that restrict outside access to a few routes (e.g., reduced 
number of outside doors), appropriately coupled with increased physical pro-
tection (stronger doors, more surveillance at selected locations, additional in-
trusion detection), will increase the protection against the external threat. 
Comment: This conclusion should be as valid today as it was when first made, provided 
that the changes are part of a systems-integrated, well-balanced physical protec-
tion systemBthe goal of the design and evaluation methodology discussed in 
Chapter 2 of this document. 
Conclusion 3: Damage control using installed systems in alternate (non-standard) ways has 
some potential for countering sabotage (or accidents).  This damage control 
method requires additional study and probably some revision to current regula-
tory practice. 
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Comment: The scope (and purpose) of this revised document did not include the examina-
tion of a particular reactor design.  As such, no definitive statement can be made 
as to the continued validity of the original conclusion.  However, given the ex-
pertise of the authors (one of whom has more than twenty years experience in 
the various tasks associated with conducting probabilistic risk assessments for 
commercial nuclear power plants), the original conclusion might be found valid 
for new plant designs. 
Conclusion 4: Damage control by running repair and/or jury rigging does not appear to be a 
viable counter to sabotage because of the associated operational impacts and the 
potential for an adversary to interfere with the damage control effort. 
Comment: While the first part of this conclusion (i.e., the associated operational impacts) 
cannot be addressed by this report (because no specific facilities were exam-
ined), the last part (i.e., the potential for an adversary to interfere) would be as 
valid today as when it was originally made. 
  Additionally, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has established six condi-
tions necessary to be in place before credit for operator actions can be taken.  If 
these conditions can be implemented, then operator actions can be credited. 
Concluding Observation: The original report’s focus was on light water reactor safety sys-
tems and re-configuration of them, layout considerations, and 
hardening of specific systems, structures, and components.  This 
report’s focus is on an iterative design and evaluation process that 
utilizes both facility design and physical protection system changes 
to optimize physical security.  Nevertheless, much of the original 
report remains valid for many of the light water reactor designs be-
ing developed in the 2007 time frame. 
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7. SUMMARY 
As indicated in Chapter 1, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has received several 
design certification applications recently, anticipates a few others, and has been notified of the 
intent of ten or more combined operating license applications between FY2007 and FY2008.  To 
address this potential, the Commission directed the NRC staff to develop a draft proposed rule-
making that would require design certification and combined operating license applicants to 
submit security assessments with their applications.  The proposed rulemaking was terminated, 
but the Commission directed the staff to complete the guidance so that applicants may utilize the 
information.  The NRC tasked Sandia National Laboratories to revise the original NUREG/CR 
document.  To ensure that the revision would be applicable (as a guidance document) in the cur-
rent and future environment, the NRC staff directed that the revision employ a global rather than 
follow the design-specific approach of the original NUREG/CR.  The global approach of the re-
vised NUREG/CR is intended to be applicable to the many various designs being presented and 
to future Gen IV designs. 
To this end the revised document provides high-level guidance for nuclear power plant design 
certification and combined operating license applicants as they: 
1. develop the layout of a facility (i.e., how buildings are arranged on the site property and 
how they are arranged internally) to enhance protection against sabotage and facilitate 
use of physical security features, 
2. design the PPS to be used at the facility, and 
3. analyze the effectiveness of the PPS against the design basis threat. 
This revised report does not provide specific recommendations for the design and evaluation of 
physical security for any specific reactor design.  The guidance and best practices identified in 
this report are applicable to the design and evaluation of physical security for any plant. 
An overview of the recommended approach for designing an effective PPS and analyzing its per-
formance is provided in Chapter 2.  This approach includes an integrated systems analysis to en-
sure that the physical protection elements function to minimize the likelihood that the PPS will 
fail to protect the targets it was designed to keep secure.  A brief description of a representative 
set of currently available analytical tools that can be used in a security system performance as-
sessment is provided in Chapter 3.  A compilation of best practices that should be considered 
during the design of a physical security system is provided in Chapter 4.  A brief description of a 
selected set of security system technologies that a nuclear power plant design team might con-
sider during the design of the plant and its physical security system is provided in Chapter 5.  As 
noted in Chapter 5, this list is representative of the technologies that are currently available or 
may become available in the near future (as of late 2006).  Because this technology area is rap-
idly expanding, the designers of a new PPS should identify those technologies that are available 
at the time they design their PPS.  Chapter 6 presents the observations and insights from the 
original NUREG/CR that are appropriate for this document (i.e., observations and insights that 
are general in nature and not design specific) and provides a comment as to the continued valid-
ity of the original observation/insight. 
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